'Trophy Architects' and design as rent-seeking: Quantifying deadweight losses in a tightly regulated office market by Cheshire, Paul C. & Dericks, Gerard H.
"Trophy Architects" and design as rent-seeking: Quantifying 
deadweight losses in a tightly regulated office market 
 
 
Paul C. Cheshire  
London School of Economics & Centre for Economic Performance 
p.cheshire@lse.ac.uk 
and 
Gerard H. Dericks  








*The authors would like to thank Jonathan Bradley, Christina Burbanks, Phil Hammond, 
Joseph Kelly, Theresa Keogh, Hannah Lakey, Gavin Murgatroyd, David Stothard, Stephen 
Waterman, City of London Planning Department, Estates Gazette, Gardiner & Theobald, 
Greater London Authority, Property Market Analysis, and Real Capital Analytics. We would 
also like to thank colleagues Gabriel Ahlfeldt, Kerwin Datu, Steve Gibbons, Christian Hilber, 
and Hans Koster, and participants in the Urban Economics Association sessions at the 
European Regional Science Association’s Congress in Palermo in August 2013 and at the 61st 
Annual North American Meetings of the Regional Science Association International in 
Washington D.C. in November 2014, where earlier versions of this paper were presented. 
Excellent research assistance was provided by Leon De-Graaf and Yu-Jen Chen. The authors 
are responsible for all errors and interpretation.  
 
  
"Trophy Architects" and design as rent-seeking: 




Britain tightly restricts the supply of office space creating substantial economic rents, but its 
development restrictions are politically administered and therefore gameable, inducing rent-
seeking activity. We find that ‘trophy architects’ (TAs) – prior winners of a lifetime 
achievement award – obtain more space on a given site apparently by signalling iconic design. 
Analysis of 2,039 office buildings shows TAs build 14 stories taller, increasing a representative 
site value by 152 percent. We argue this premium is compensation for the extra costs, risks and 
delays of using a TA to game the planning system; and therefore an indirect measure of 
deadweight rent-seeking losses. 
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 [the Minister]… “will only approve skyscrapers of exceptional design. For a building of this 
size to be acceptable, the quality of its design is critical… the proposed tower is of highest 
architectural quality” (Deputy Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, John Prescott, 2003) 
 
Why does the incidence of tall buildings vary so substantially across the world’s cities – even 
cities of similar size and prosperity? The answer appears to be largely regulation. It is also 
notable that the largest buildings in some cities are designed by architects we define here as 
‘Trophy Architects’ (TAs) whereas in others they are not. TAs we identify on the basis of 
having won one of architecture’s three major lifetime achievement awards, so certifying their 
outstanding reputations to the world at large. This paper investigates what role such architects 
may play in the extreme case of London, a city with particularly restrictive regulation 
constraining the supply of office space, making it hard to construct tall buildings and so 
generating substantial potential rents, but with a regulatory system where decisions are as 
much politically as rule determined. 
 
Our results suggest that the primary function of these TAs in London is as rent-seeking 
agents. In so far as the evidence supports this conclusion we can cast light on what has long 
proved to be a kind of ‘dark matter’ for public economics; credible quantitative estimates of 
the costs of rent-seeking. Surprisingly, despite the ubiquity and relative stringency of land 
market regulation worldwide, we are aware of only one previous attempt to quantify rent-
seeking costs in this context (Antwi and Adams, 2003). As well as contributing to the 
growing literature on land use regulation and that on rent-seeking, this paper also adds to the 
emerging literature on the ‘vertical city’ or tall buildings, to our understanding of the extent 
and sources of any premium for star architect design and the relatively small body of studies 
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of commercial real estate using sales data from observed transactions for individual 
buildings.  
 
The emerging vertical city literature has found increasingly persuasive evidence of vertical 
agglomeration economies as well as price premia (Koster et al., 2014 or Liu et al., 2018). In 
addition a recent contribution (Ahlfeldt and McMillen, 2019) has documented the role played 
by the supply side as well as the demand side in the incidence of tall office compared to 
residential buildings: they have different costs of construction. 
 
As with previous studies we find a significant relationship between architectural design and 
economic outcomes (Asabere et al, 1989; Fuerst et al, 2011; Gat, 1998; Hough and Kratz, 
1983; Nase et al, 2013; Vandell and Lane, 1989), measuring ‘economic outcomes’ as the 
price paid for space. Buildings designed by our TAs do command a small but significant 
premium suggesting that there is a productivity advantage associated with their buildings. 
This is dwarfed, however, by their capacity to get additional floors on a given site when 
regulations do not absolutely forbid this. Abstracting from this design premium, we are then 
able to estimate the increase in site value attributable only to the extra floorspace, the 
signalling power of their reputations appears to allow. 
 
Tall buildings command a premium – often substantially greater than the cost of making them 
taller (Glaeser et al, 2005; Cheshire and Hilber, 2008). The number of tall buildings per 
capita varies remarkably in cities around the world. Elementary urban economics leads one to 
expect there to be more in big cities as agglomeration economies and land prices increase 
with city size, especially where such cities, like Hong Kong, are crowded onto islands; or are 
constrained by growth boundaries. But while the New York metro area is more than twice as 
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populous as Hong Kong, Hong Kong has eight times as many skyscrapers1 – buildings over 
100 meters tall – per person than New York. A medium sized, provincial city such as 
Brisbane, Australia, has six times as many skyscrapers per person as Paris and eight times as 
many as London. Topping all cities in the tall buildings league table is a real surprise: 
Benidorm in Spain. This small tourist city has some 71,000 residents but 1.15 times as many 
skyscrapers and nearly 17 times as many high rise buildings – buildings over 35 meters – per 
resident as New York.  
 
In both these leagues, London, despite its size and prosperity and one of the most tightly 
constraining growth boundaries in the world, comes near or at the bottom. The only tall 
building league London tops is the proportion of its skyscrapers designed by TAs: on the 
definition used in this paper – 25 percent compared to only 3 percent in Chicago and zero in 
Brussels or Benidorm. This, alone, is enough to demonstrate that the essential role of TAs in 
London is not that they have particular skills at designing tall buildings.  
 
An increasing volume of literature demonstrates that British land markets are some of the 
most tightly regulated in the developed world (Cheshire and Sheppard, 2002, 2005; Cheshire 
and Hilber, 2008; Cheshire et al., 2015; Hilber and Vermeulen, 2016). Land supply for urban 
development has been tightly constrained since 1947 and supply for each legal category of 
use is separately regulated. There are also tight regulations on building heights throughout 
Britain. Every significant decision, moreover, is politically determined, so lobbies flourish 
and decisions are gameable. 
 
                                                 
1 Information on the number of skyscrapers or high rise buildings by city is from http://www.emporis.com/; data 
on population are from official figures and estimated for comparable metro areas, represented by Functional 
Urban Regions or Metropolitan Statistical Areas. 
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Given such a system it was not surprising that Cheshire and Hilber (2008) found the 
regulatory burden on office development in London, measured as a Regulatory Tax (RT) as 
originally defined by Glaeser et al., 2005, was the highest estimated for any major office 
location in Western Europe. Only Brussels approached the low level of regulatory burden 
estimated for New York by Glaeser et al. (2005). According to Cheshire and Hilber (2008) 
across British cities this value of RT (measured as the difference between the price of office 
space and its marginal construction costs, as a percentage tax) far exceeded any found in 
European office centres. In London’s West End it averaged 809 percent between 1999 and 
2005. The highest value found in any year in Manhattan was 50 percent (Glaeser et al.; 
2005). Cheshire and Hilber (2008) also provided direct evidence that regulatory 
restrictiveness was the primary cause of the high values of RT observed in Britain. 
 
We have, therefore, good evidence that the system of land use regulation in Britain creates 
very significant economic rents. In an influential paper Krueger (1974)2 pointed out that if 
regulatory restrictions create economic rents, people and economic agents will compete for 
them and compete in a variety of ways ranging from outright illegality via, for example, 
bribery or extortion, to more benign and legal means. In so far as these rent-seeking activities 
do not take the form of productive activities or pure transfers they represent a deadweight 
welfare loss (see Krueger, 1974; or Posner, 1975). Even though the concept of rent-seeking 
and its implications have been influential, quantifying the magnitude of deadweight losses 
arising from even specific examples has proved to be difficult and comparatively few 
empirical studies exist (De Rosal, 2011). As Tullock (1997) complained: ‘…I have been 
perturbed by the difficulty of finding any actual measurable cost….’ However, we argue that 
                                                 
2 Tullock (1967) had come up with a similar idea although it could be argued its origins go further back than 
even 1967. 
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the use of trophy architects in London to gain permission to build bigger buildings on a given 
site is a specific case where we can produce a credible, if approximate3, measure of the net 
deadweight losses arising from the employment of TAs as rent-seeking agents. 
 
So far as we know Evans (1988), was the first to observe that Krueger’s model translates 
almost precisely into the context of restrictive land use regulations and, in particular, applies 
to the British system of land use planning4. The specific mechanisms of the British system 
are particularly relevant to the issue of rent-seeking since, unlike the US Zoning or European 
Master Planning systems, the British system is not rule-based. Decisions in the British 
context, while informed by planning policies, are ultimately political; and therefore 
gameable5. The initial decision on whether to permit development is taken by a political 
committee - the Local Planning Authority (LPA).This can be appealed ultimately to the 
national government minister responsible for the planning system.  
 
The quotation at the head of this paper is taken from such an appeal decision from the then 
minister deciding to give permission for the Shard – now the tallest building in London. The 
decision-making surrounding the Shard’s route to gaining planning consent illustrates what 
we have in mind perfectly.  Irvine Sellar, a real estate investor with no experience of large 
scale development, bought a building near London Bridge Station in 1998 purely as an 
investment (Sellar, 2015). Very soon afterwards the government announced it would 
encourage higher density development near transport hubs. Opportunistically Sellar thought 
                                                 
3 It is approximate for a number of reasons but one is that there could be unmeasured ‘consumption benefits’ from 
TA-designed buildings for tourists and passers-by. While we tested for ‘external production’ benefits from views 
or proximity to TA buildings and found none, there could still, however, be social benefits we fail to capture. 
4 A similar point in the context of the US system was made by Sass and Pogodzinski (1990). Neither of these 
sets of authors attempted any quantification. 
5 There are guidelines influencing decisions, such as the National Planning Policy Framework (DCLG, 2012) or 
local plans, but these are no more than guides, subject to political decisions within the legal framework. 
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why not develop a 400 metres tall building with 8-times the internal space as the existing 
1960s built HQ of PriceWaterhouseCoopers. He consulted the head planner at the Borough of 
Southwark (Fred Manson) and was told that ‘it would need a signature architecture to win 
approval’ (Guardian, 17 March 2017).  Renzo Piano had won his second TA award, the 
Pritzker Prize, in 1998 so Sellar went directly to Berlin to recruit him for the project. 
Although denounced by English Heritage, who inadvertently coined the name by which it is 
known claiming it would “tear through historic London like a shard of glass” the project 
ultimately gained permission. The government minister who was the final decision maker 
after the public enquiry, was John (now Lord) Prescott. He may not have been an 
architectural connoisseur but was persuaded of the building’s ‘highest architectural quality’, 
surely helped by Renzo Piano’s recent award of the Nobel prize of architecture, and so gave 
permission. When asked if he would do a tall building in London again, given the immense 
difficulties, Sellar (2015) answered he would ‘because it is very profitable’. 
 
This is only anecdotal evidence of the causal link between employing a TA and obtaining 
permission to build taller. However, we have found persuasive and more systematic evidence 
from the comparison between London and Chicago reported in section IV. In London 
receiving one of the three awards we use to define TA status is associated with an architect’s 
buildings becoming 11 floors taller: but in the unconstrained context of Chicago there is no 
height gain in their buildings at all. This does strongly support the conclusion that it is the 
reputational signalling power of an architect’s lifetime achievement award, not the distinctive 
quality of a building’s design, which allows a TA to game the system in London. 
 
Despite the size of the economic rents potentially at stake, the British land use planning 
system produces few cases of proven corruption but it does appear to produce a rather more 
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elevated form of rent-seeking activity on the part of developers: the employment of TAs to 
game the system and stack more floors onto a given site. We also find that the quantity of 
extra space obtained in this manner interacts with the local restrictiveness of the planning 
system. It is significantly more difficult to build taller in Boroughs with more restrictive 
planning regimes.  While TA designed buildings do command a price premium per square 
metre, the additional value conferred on the site arises predominantly from the extra space in 
a TA building, so suggesting a substantial – in section V we estimate 62.5 percent of the 
increase - rent-seeking component. Buildings designed by TAs and located on sites where tall 
buildings are not absolutely prohibited, are systematically and very significantly taller – 14 
floors taller – than those designed by ‘standard’ architects.  
 
Offsetting for the extra price per square metre of space we then compare the value of the 
extra space that TAs generate on a representative site with the direct costs of TA construction 
– their buildings cost more to build. We find that even with these higher construction costs 
TAs appear to represent a hugely profitable form of not just rent-seeking but rent-acquisition 
for the developer: a 152 percent increase in returns. The direct cost of more expensive 
construction appears to be only a small component of the additional costs associated with 
employing a TA to game the system, however. In particular, large TA schemes are subject to 
greater scrutiny and likely to be appealed at every stage with a greater probability of ultimate 
failure. This adds legal and consultancy costs and waiting time but, above all, increases 
uncertainty. This uncertainty will be translated into a greater risk premium and higher 
financing costs (Mayo and Sheppard, 2001). Developers will therefore require a higher 
expected rate of return to justify the gamble of hiring a TA to gain permission to build extra 
space on a given site.  
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Given  that the London real estate market is reasonably efficient and competitive (Cheshire 
and Hilber, 2008) we can infer that the rents we estimate for a representative site successfully 
developed using a TA are close to the expected costs of that rent-seeking6. Since we net out 
any ‘productive value’ of TA design by offsetting for the price premium their space 
commands, we can say that TA costs will also approximate the total deadweight welfare loss 
less, perhaps some external social benefits to people enjoying the view of the TA buildings. 
Note, however, that we tested for and found no evidence to support the possibility that views 
or proximity to TA designed buildings increase the value (so by implications benefits of) 
other office buildings. 
 
Our paper proceeds as follows: we first explain the basic mechanisms of the British planning 
system focusing on its particular operation in London. The next section describes our data, 
followed by a section setting out our central empirical estimates of the impact of TA design 
on the size of office buildings. We then analyse the impact of TA design in terms of the price 
per m2 of built space and per m2 of site area. Section IV examines the evidence for our causal 
interpretation: that TAs are employed in London essentially as agents to obtain rents 
generated by restrictions on the supply of office space. In Section V, we compare the increase 
in the value of permitted space estimated for a representative site in the City of London 
associated with a TA to the extra construction costs employing a TA imposes. We then 
conclude. 
 
                                                 
6 In the rent-seeking literature this is termed the ‘complete dissipation’ hypothesis (see De Rosal, 2011). 
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I. THE PLANNING SYSTEM IN LONDON 
To understand how the rents we claim exist are generated and how prestigious design(ers) 
can be used to seek them, it is essential to understand some details of England’s planning 
system and its particular features in London7. Permission to build is not given because of a 
quasi rule-based zoning system as in the US nor as in the even more rule-based Master 
Planning system of Continental Europe. Permissions rest on a process known as 
‘development control’, exercised by the relevant Local Planning Authority (LPA) which is 
the smallest governmental jurisdiction. There are 357 such LPAs in England and 13 within 
inner London. Any building, qualifying extension or alteration, or any change of legal use 
requires development permission from the LPA. The LPA is composed of local politicians 
advised by professional planning officers. In October 2018 46 percent of English LPAs had 
an up to date local plan: the rest did not. Even when there is a local plan, decisions may not 
follow it; equally decisions may not follow the guidance of the professional officers. They are 
highly political and subject to lobbying. There is then a system of appeal, first to the planning 
inspectorate and then, beyond that, to the national government minister responsible for 
planning and development. In practice this means that the outcome of applications for 
development cannot be predicted beforehand, there can be long (5-years would not be 
uncommon) delays as decisions go through the three tiers of decision-making and all 
decisions are subject to lobbying and political pressure. This planning framework was 
established by the Town and Country Planning Act of 1947: so it has been in place in its 
essential form for 70 years. 
 
                                                 
7 Planning in the three countries of Great Britain shares many features but there are specific differences, 
particularly in Scotland. There are also some particular features of planning in London, especially in the City of 
London and Docklands – see text for details. 
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While effectively established in 1947, there were earlier legal policies relevant for building in 
London going back to the 19th century. Before about 1875 finance and technology restricted 
building heights but the invention of elevators and steel frames allowed for much taller 
buildings (Turvey, 1998). But height and building sizes in London became strictly controlled 
following the London Council Act of 1890 which set a statutory limit of 27m plus two stories 
in the roof; then decreased in 1894 to 24m plus 6m to the rooftop (Inwood, 2005, p.211). 
Therefore neither skyscrapers – nor anything resembling skyscrapers – were built in London 
until after 1956, when these blanket height restrictions were finally abandoned. However 
even after 1956 the then London County Council continued to enforce plot-ratio restrictions 
of between 2 and 5½:1, and individual London Boroughs separately maintained their own 
prohibitions on high rise building: some, such as Islington, continue even to 2019 to prohibit 
any building above 7 stories except for a small area bordering the City of London. The City 
itself gradually relaxed some restrictions during the 1980s and 1990s although specific 
provisions, such as Conservation Areas still prevent building high on a substantial proportion 
of its area (City of London, 2010). 
 
In addition, there are sight corridors protected under the London View Management 
Framework along which no building may be higher than the base of the dome of St Pauls (see 
Figure 2), and additional height protected zones specified for areas surrounding the London 
Monument, the Tower of London, the Thames River, and a number of historic and skyline 
features (City of London, 2012). These height restrictions cover a large proportion of inner 
London – 75 percent of the Borough of Westminster, for example, has Conservation Area 
status. Individual buildings may also be ‘Listed’: given historic preservation status that 
forbids any external or internal alteration. There are more than 30,000 such buildings in Inner 
London. 
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To summarize, therefore, the planning and related policies that are strictly relevant for the 
analysis in this paper are: 
1. Decisions on development applications are made by means of ‘development control’ 
– so decisions to permit any legally defined development are typically discretionary, made 
by locally elected politicians and subject to appeal. This process is quasi-judicial in 
character but ultimate power of decision rests with the responsible national minister when 
the appeal process is exhausted8; 
2. Absolute height restrictions prior to 1956; 
3. Plot-ratios (equivalent to Floor Area Ratios) restricting the allowable floor area on a 
given site thereafter until the 1980s and 1990s; 
4.  Continuing binding height restrictions within; Conservations Areas, Protected view 
lines of St Pauls extending as far as 16kms, the Houses of Parliament, the Monument, the 
Tower of London, the Thames Policy area, and an absolute ban on the re-development of 
the numerous Listed buildings in Central London. 
 
II. DATA 
Descriptive statistics are shown in Tables 1 and 2. 
II.i Sample of buildings and sales 
Data on office building characteristics and sale prices were obtained from Estates Gazette 
(EG), CoStar and Real Capital Analytics (RCA). Our aim was to capture the whole 
                                                 
8 Development has a legal definition under the 1947 Act and subsequent amendments to that Act. In effect it 
relates to any change of use of an existing plot of land or building unless the change is exempt. Very small 
extensions or alterations outside Conservation Areas are exempt but all office construction or change of use from, 
say, a shop to an office, even without physical alteration, would constitute ‘development’ and need permission. 
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population of office buildings sold in Inner London9 between 1998 and 2018. Combined, 
there were some 6,500 unique sales over this period. This dataset however had to be cleaned 
and supplemented with additional information about individual buildings and we restricted 
the sample to purpose-built office buildings of three or more floors and at least 150m2 of 
floorspace to avoid offices in shops or industrial premises or other buildings designed for 
other purposes. We also discarded all sales which occurred less than 12 months following the 
previous sale (Clapp and Giacotto, 1999). The location of buildings in the sample is shown in 
Figure 1. The resulting final number of distinct buildings was 2,039 which, allowing for those 
sold more than once, yielded a total of 2,739 sales.  
 
Tables 1 & 2 here: Descriptive statistics for building size and hedonic regressions 
II.ii Trophy Architects 
Architectural excellence is necessarily a subjective judgment but peer recognition seems the 
most objective measure available; it also – for purposes of testing our hypothesis – has the 
advantage of visibility to politicians and planners. We have taken the lifetime achievement 
awards from the Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA), the American Institute of 
Architects (AIA), and the Pritzker Prize as the most prestigious and obvious recognition of 
architectural excellence and so classified all winners as ‘TAs’. We adopt this term to 
emphasize that we are identifying not necessarily the ‘best’ architects but those with the most 
powerful signalling power of architectural merit.  
 
For regressions on building size, buildings are recognized as designed by ‘TAs’ if the 
architect’s first TA award had been conferred before the building in question received 
planning permission. For the regressions involving building sales, a sale is defined as a ‘TA 
                                                 
9 For the relevant definition of Inner London see Dericks (2013). 
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sale’ if the architect had received their first TA award before the building sale. Additionally, 
in the case of eponymous architectural firms, the architect who won the relevant TA award 
must have been alive and working at the time the building was designed. By these definitions 
our data yielded 105 TA buildings in the size sample and 186 TA building sales. The 
architects and the tall buildings in our sample are discussed in Appendix 3. Of the 105 
buildings designed by TAs in the size sample, 41 were built before 1956 (between 1870 and 
1928), and therefore in an era when available technology or statutory regulations absolutely 
restricted their height. These pre-1956 buildings are referred to as ‘Pre-Modern’ TA buildings 
in contrast to ‘Modern’ TA buildings. Of the remaining 64 modern TA buildings, 27 are 
located outside a Height Protected Area (HPA) and so had potential flexibility with respect to 
their size via the process of development control and TA signalling power. This means the 
number of observations available for identification is relatively small but cannot be increased 
since it constitutes the entire available population of such buildings. 
 
II.iii Planning and amenity data 
Data on Conservation Areas was acquired from English Heritage as was data on the ‘Listed’ 
status of buildings. Analysis revealed that roughly half of the total land area sampled is 
covered by Conservation Areas. Of the 2,039 buildings in the sample, 29 percent were built 
while within a HPA and 19 percent are now Listed.  
 
Figure 1 here: The 546 postcode sectors and 2,039 office locations 
The variables Conservation Area density, Listed Building density, and Parks & Gardens 
density were estimated by; (i) calculating the area contained within each separate boundary, 
(ii) randomly placing a point for each 100m2 of Conservation Area or 10m2 in the case of the 
other two, within the area delimited by that boundary, and (iii) then summing the number of 
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points for each variable falling within a 300m radius of each office property. The 300m 
radius was chosen for these variables as in each case it performed better in our hedonic 
models than 100m or 500m. 
 
For the analyses of the effects of HPA status, buildings are recognized as such if they were 
built within any of the following areas after the relevant height restriction came into force: 
Conservation Areas, St Pauls Heights Policy Area, Monument Viewing Corridors, Tower of 
London Local Setting, London Strategic Viewing Corridors, Thames Policy Area, or areas 
deemed sensitive due to proximity to historic or landmark structures. A building is not 
regarded as being built in a HPA if the site was occupied by a ‘tall’ building before the area 
became height protected, and therefore ‘tall’ building permission was effectively 
grandfathered (where ‘tall’ is defined as exceeding the normal permissible height on the site 
at the time redevelopment was approved). Figure 2 maps these areas. For the price models, 
buildings were defined as located in a HPA if the building was located within a HPA at the 
time of sale. 
 
Figure 2 here: HPAs 
II.iv Planning permission refusal rate 
To measure the restrictiveness of LPAs we use the data set on office planning refusal rates 
from 1990 to 2008 collected by Hilber and Vermeulen (2016). Since we use refusal rates 
purely as a control, any reverse causation does not affect our analyses (Ioannidis and Silver, 
1999). As the City of London and the Docklands LPAs have exceptional planning regimes, 
measured ‘planning restrictiveness’ in these areas may imply something rather different. To 
reflect this we add specific dummies for them in the building size models. 
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II.v Employment density 
Data on annual 2000-2008 postcode sector local employment in London is taken from the 
NOMIS Annual Business Inquiry (ABI) Employee Analysis. Following Wheaton et al. 
(1997) who found that the primary driver of office demand in London was financial and 
business services employment, we only include employees in our measure in 2003 SIC codes 
J or K; corresponding to banking, finance, business services and insurance. 
 
The number of points corresponding to the employment counts within the boundaries of each 
of the 546 postcode sectors (excluding areas in which there could be no employment such as 
parks and water bodies) were randomly placed within each boundary for each year. 
Systematic testing in the hedonic model showed that coefficient size and statistical 
significance peaked at 600m and declined monotonically in both directions from there. 
Previous empirical studies of the effect of employment density on economic outcomes such 
as Arzaghi and Henderson (2008) or Jennen and Brounen (2009) found that employment 
within 500m of office buildings corresponded to the optimal radial bandwidth for New York 
and Amsterdam. We found results of the hedonic models were not changed according to 
whether estimates for employment in the building itself was included or not in our 
calculations. For our building size analyses, because our employment measure was only 
available from 2000 while many of the buildings were built before the 20th century, the mean 
600m employment between 2000 and 2008 is used as a proxy for the employment levels 
relevant for the building at the time of construction. 
 
II.vi Access to labour force 
Access to the labour force was represented by distance to the nearest underground (subway) 
or other rail station.  
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II.vii Building characteristics and submarkets 
Submarket dummies were based on the EG’s definition and details are shown in Appendix 1. 
The building quality measure comes directly from EG, which grades each floor of a building 
as either A or B. Buildings with only grade A space are graded as an A, both A and B space 
graded as A/B, and B space only is the omitted dummy variable. Additionally, a dummy for 
the decade in which the building was constructed is included. 
 
III. ANALYSIS 
III.i Can TAs build bigger? 
The first question is whether office buildings designed by TAs have more floorspace on a 
given site. Before 1956 the height of a building was fixed by either statutory regulations or 
technology so we do not expect to find any TA effect for buildings built before then. We also 
do not expect to find that even the most acclaimed architects would have been able to flex the 
regulations governing the height and appearance of buildings built in a designated HPA10. 
We test this hypothesis for total floorspace relative to site size and then for height alone. 
 
Table 3 here: Can TAs build bigger? Dep. Var.: Total floorspace/ site area 
Table 3 reports the results where total floorspace relative to site area is the dependent 
variable. Model 1 simply lumps all TA buildings together and has few controls. Since we 
only expect TAs might plausibly be able to build bigger outside a HPA and after 1956, Model 
2 interacts a Modern TA dummy for the building with built outside a HPA. The resulting co-
                                                 
10 Though we do find one exception – the 16-floor New Court new Rothschild HQ building by TA Rem Koolhas 
was negotiated with City planners in a Conservation Area. It was the fourth rebuild or extension to the 
Rothschild’s HQ since 1800. 
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efficient suggests a much bigger effect and just being a TA no longer has a significant 
impact. Subsequent models add the decade in which the building was constructed, dummies 
for the City of London and Docklands, and then in Model 5, the local density of employment 
around the building. The basic result that Modern-TA buildings are significantly bigger is 
supported, and we see that the ability of a TA to get more space is confined to sites outside 
HPAs: and that all buildings are significantly smaller relative to the size of their sites, the 
more restrictive the local planning regime is. Consistent with a role for local agglomeration 
economies we also find that, all else equal, buildings are bigger the greater the local 
concentration of office employment is around them.  
 
Given the relatively small number of TA buildings outside a HPA there has to be concern as 
to the robustness of these findings. The results reported in Table A1 provide some checks. 
We apply the quite stringent test of successively dropping the TA building outside a HPA 
with the largest floor to site area ratio, then the two largest and finally the three largest. Very 
reassuringly almost nothing changes except, obviously, the estimated extent of the additional 
floorspace a TA generates for a given site outside a HPA. 
 
Table 4 here: Can TAs build taller? Dep. Var.: No. of floors above ground level 
The way TAs succeed in getting more office space on a given site is revealed in Table 4. 
Their buildings are very much taller. Outside a HPA their buildings have more than 14 extra 
floors compared with a median building height across the sample of just 7 floors and so are 
almost 60m taller than buildings designed by standard architects (SAs).  
 
Not surprisingly, within HPAs all office buildings tend to be lower and the effect of the other 
variables of interest, local employment density and planning restrictiveness continue as in 
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Table 3. As before we subject the results to the robustness test of successively dropping the 
three tallest buildings. Again results are not affected (see Table A2). 
 
That TA buildings are taller does not exclude the possibility that they also have a larger 
footprint on a given site. Table 5 shows the results of testing this idea. It reveals a more 
complex situation. Inside a HPA all buildings have a larger building footprint to site area 
ratio presumably as developers strive to get additional floorspace on a given site without 
adding to height. Modern TA status outside a HPA, however, has little significant effect 
although the effect is positive and significant at the 10 percent level in the most completely 
specified model, model (4). The general effect of TA design, however, is significantly to 
reduce the footprint to site area. The effect of other variables on the size of the building 
footprint relative to that of the site remain much as previous results would lead one to expect. 
More restrictive LPAs are associated with significantly smaller building footprints, other 
things controlled for, but greater concentration of local office employment increases the size 
of a building’s footprint. 
 
Table 5 here: Can TAs get a bigger building footprint? Dep. Var.: Footprint/ site area 
  
III.ii What is the value associated with a TA? 
We see that TA buildings are bigger so they have more rentable space which, all else equal, 
will increase their value but other factors associated with TA design may raise or reduce 
capital values per m2. While a TA building could command a rent premium, a less 
conventional layout might reduce the rent per m2 or the proportion of space that is usable. 
Unconventional building materials or design might also impose additional maintenance costs 
(for example, the costs of cleaning angled windows in Norman Foster’s 40-floor Gherkin 
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building). The unusual design might mean (and we find some evidence of this - see online 
Appendix 4) it takes longer to rent out a building: this would reduce the price but not the 
observed rents. Accordingly, rents and capital values could be affected differently: rent per 
m2 might rise because of prestige but less rentable space or higher maintenance costs might 
nevertheless reduce capital values overall. In sum, we cannot predict the net effect of TA 
design on value per m2 a priori: it is an empirical question. 
 
We investigate by means of a ‘classic’ hedonic model. The focus of our interest is on several 
characteristics of buildings and their settings and also on specific price estimates. 
Recognizing the well-known problems of omitted variables we have made great efforts to 
incorporate as wide a range of relevant control variables as possible and, in particular,  the 
impact of TA design on price. We have also looked carefully to see if there is evidence 
supporting the emerging tall buildings literature (see for example Liu et al., 2018): an 
ultimately rising value for taller buildings all else equal. 
 
 Table 6 here: What do TAs yield in price/m2 of building? Dep. var.: ln(price/m2) 
Results are reported in Tables 6 and 7. Note that whereas previously we have been analysing 
the physical characteristics of 2,039 buildings, we are now measuring the capital value per m2 
achieved in 2,739 transactions over the period 1998-2018 from those same buildings. White 
tests do not reject homoskedasticity, and so normal standard errors are reported. 
 
The dependent variable in the models reported in Table 6 is the observed price with the 
building’s floor area included as an independent variable. The results for all models confirm 
that a building’s price is increased if it is in a HPA or local planning is more restrictive (both 
making space relative more scarce). They also provide evidence supporting the importance of 
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localised agglomeration economics: the effect of localised employment density in the primary 
office sectors on a building’s price is always highly significant and positive. Some wholly 
insignificant variables are not shown: for example in no models experimented with did the 
number of parking spaces have any significant effect on a building’s price. This is perhaps 
not surprising for London given the reliance on public mass transit and the congestion charge 
on cars using the central zone where almost all the buildings in the sample are located. The 
effect of most other variables is as might be expected.  
 
Two aspects of buildings have been explored more intensively. The first relates to design; the 
second to its own height. It has been suggested that ‘Listing’ a commercial building might 
reduce its value (Cullingworth and Nadin, 2015, p.242) since its fabric cannot be adapted or 
modernized; but historic designation might also be associated with a higher value. Our results 
show that not only do Listed office buildings in London command a premium but having 
more Listed buildings in the vicinity of the building sold also significantly increases its price. 
We also find a significant premium for TA design although the significance of the premium 
seems to be eroded somewhat once the building height is controlled for (models (2) and (4)).  
We also explored the possibility that views of, or proximity to, TA-buildings increased a 
given building’s price, so suggesting possible production externalities.  We experimented 
adding (i) TA building counts over distance bands of 600m, 800m, and 1000m, while (ii) 
varying our TA sample to only reflect buildings above 7 floors, the minimum height 
necessary to have any real views, (iii) summing up all the floors above 7F of nearby TA 
buildings, (iv) summing up the number of TA awards earned by TAs of their nearby 
buildings, and interactions between either (ii) or (iii) with (iv). None of these specifications 
yielded a significant price effect (result available from authors).  
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 There is, in London, as in the Netherlands, a documented rental premium for higher floors – 
see Cheshire and Hilber (2008) and Koster et al. (2014b). Moreover there is an emerging 
literature on tall buildings and vertical agglomeration economies. Our data is not ideal for 
fully exploring this aspect of building price since we do not have price or rent by floor: only 
the total price of individual buildings of known height. We tried to reflect the evidence of Liu 
et al., (2018) who found that the ground floor commanded a substantial rent premium but the 
rent for the first floor (in UK usage – second floor in US usage) fell by 50 percent with rising 
rents thereafter and a more rapid acceleration above some 30 floors. We are not able to 
estimate the marginal effect on price of more floors but models (3) and (4) include dummies 
for the impact of a building being more than 11 and less than 20 floors; between 21 and 30 
floors; or taller than 31 floors. The number of observations of buildings more than about 20 
floors makes it difficult to have finer classifications. We see all three classes increase a 
building’s price all else equal with the biggest and most significant increase for the tallest 
buildings. The intermediate class – 21-30 floors – though positive is imprecisely estimated 
and not significantly different from the 11 to 20 class.  
 
TA design in all models does appear to have a significant impact on a building’s price 
suggesting some productivity advantage accruing to its occupiers. We have already seen that 
TA design achieves larger – notably taller – buildings on a given site if that site is not in a 
HPA. So now let us turn to estimating the impact that TAs have on the total price of a 
building on a given site allowing for both these impacts: buildings which are both bigger and 
more valuable per m2. The results are reported in Table 7 where the dependent variable is the 
price paid for the building per unit area of its site.  
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Table 7 here: What value does a TA add to a site? Dep. var,: ln(price/site area m2) 
The models follow closely those reported in Table 6 but include whether the building was 
inside a HPA when planning permission was granted and also interacts this with whether it 
was designed by a TA. We see that in all specifications the interactive benefit of a TA 
building built outside a HPA (and so with those extra floors on a given site) is substantial and 
significant. The total effect on a building’s price relative to the size of its site, if it is designed 
by a TA outside a HPA, is the value of the TA and ‘TA outside HPA’ coefficients summed. 
In the most preferred specification – reported as Model 4 – the combined effect of these two 
factors is approximately .923, or, given the semi-log specification, a 152 percent increase in 
average building price11.  
 
Taken together, TAs both have a significant influence on the price per unit of floorspace, and 
produce significant value outside HPAs through increasing total floorspace by building some 
14 floors taller. 
 
IV. CAUSATION 
For these results to allow us to infer anything about the costs of rent seeking there has to be a 
causal relationship. Employing a TA must be a mechanism developers use to signal that their 
building is of ‘exceptional architectural merit’ and so influence decision-makers to relax 
height restrictions to capture the economic rents London’s planning restrictions generate.  
However because of the nature of our data, no obvious instruments are available nor are other 
standard econometric tools employed to establish causation feasible. We address this critical 
issue of causation, therefore, by assembling a combination of mutually re-enforcing evidence 
                                                 
11 See Kennedy (1981) for this calculation. 
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for TAs’ causal effect on building height in London. We first conduct a quasi-natural 
experiment on what happens to the height of buildings when an architect gains TA status in: 
a) the highly regulated, space-constrained but gameable context of London where rent-
seeking should be expected to have a reward, compared to; b) the unconstrained and difficult 
to game context of Chicago where there are no rents to be gained. While our sample of 
buildings in the two cities is exhaustive, indeed is the whole relevant population so far as we 
are able to discover, the combined sample is still only 86 or 87 buildings so may not be 
judged wholly persuasive. It should be noted that this is not a simple extension of the sample 
of TA-buildings. Indeed, since in our definition to be classified as a TA-building, a building 
had to have received planning permission before the architect’s first TA award was conferred, 
many are not TA buildings. They were designed before their architect had become a TA. 
 
We then systematically rule out plausible alternative explanations as to why offices designed 
by TAs on non-Height Protected sites in London could be so much taller than those designed 
by SAs and also demonstrate that being a TA is not in general associated with the ability to 
design tall buildings. In our judgment, taken together this evidence generates a kind of 
triangulation process: while none on its own may be conclusive, in combination the evidence 
is very persuasive. 
 
IV.i Quasi-natural experiment 
 
Our specific definition of a ‘Trophy Architect’ necessarily implies that buildings which were 
designed by a TA before they won a relevant award are not classed as ‘TA buildings’. 
Therefore in practice different buildings by the same designer have different ‘TA’ statuses. 
We exploit this fact to test for causation by examining what happens to building height when 
an architect gains TA status in two very different regulatory contexts. 
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As previously noted, the supply of office space in London is tightly restricted by the planning 
system but decisions within that system are eminently gameable because they are 
discretionary. In contrast, in Chicago, it is reasonable to assume potential ‘rents’ from getting 
more office space on a given site are negligible because, as in New York (see Glaeser et al., 
2005, p354) regulation has a negligible restricting effect on the supply of office space. This 
has been recently documented in a number of studies (Barr, 2013; Ahlfeldt and McMillen, 
2018). All height restrictions were removed in Chicago in 1923 although Floor Area Ratio 
restrictions, though generous, remain. Moreover, the system of land use regulation there, as 
elsewhere in the US, is ‘rule-based’ and so is much more difficult to game than the British 
system. 
 
If employing a TA is a rent-seeking mechanism in London, then the receipt of TA status 
should be associated with the architects’ buildings becoming considerably taller. Their newly 
acquired status means they can now be employed to signal the architectural merit of their 
buildings (that 25 percent of all London skyscrapers are TA designed compared to 3 percent 
in Chicago is already highly suggestive). By contrast in Chicago we would not expect 
buildings to increase in height once their designer gains TA status. We test this hypothesis 
and report the results in Table 8. 
 
There are necessarily a restricted number of observations but we made a great effort to 
include all buildings from architects active in either London or Chicago since 1923 and who 
designed both before and after their TA award. The individual Chicago buildings are itemized 
and described in Table A7. 
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What we want to estimate is the increase in height observed in, respectively, London and 
Chicago following the award of TA status. Given our sample size restrictions we limit 
independent variables to; London/Chicago, TA/non-TA status, and Built in/Outside HPA 
dummies combined with their two and three-way interactions, and five decade built dummy 
controls. Given that some such interactions are empty sets the model we fit, therefore, is: 
 
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 = 𝑏𝑏0 + 𝑏𝑏1(𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿 × 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 × 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵 𝑂𝑂𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑂 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇) + 𝑏𝑏2(𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 × 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇) +
𝑏𝑏5(𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹) + 𝑏𝑏3(𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇) + 𝑏𝑏4(𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵 𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇) + 𝑏𝑏6(𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑂 𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑) + ϵ  
  
where,  
𝑏𝑏0 = constant 
 
𝑏𝑏1 = the causal effect of TAs on building height outside HPAs in London 
 
𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿/𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 = building is located in London or Chicago 
 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = building designed after architect received their TA status  
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵 𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿/𝑂𝑂𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑂 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇 = building built in a HPA at time of construction. None of the 




The results reported in Table 8 show that, all else equal, buildings in Chicago are a lot taller 
than in London (depending on the specification some 27 to 35 floors taller). But in Chicago 
gaining TA status adds nothing to a building’s height – indeed if anything once an architect 
has gained TA status their buildings tend to be shorter; but this height reduction is not 
statistically significant. In London, in contrast, consistent with our underlying hypothesis, 
gaining TA status leads to a substantial and highly significant increase in building height. In 
the models with age controls the gain is between 9 and 11 floors (Columns 2 and 4). In our 
judgment the results reported in Column 4, with age controls but omitting 1 Canada Sq. are 
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likely to be the most reliable. This is because this building was constructed when the area was 
controlled by the London Docklands Corporation which operated special planning rules 
designed to maximize development, thus making it unnecessary to try to ‘game the system’ to 
get extra space on a given site. These results imply that the effect in London of gaining TA 
status is estimated to add a similar – certainly not statistically different - height to a building 
as the average effect estimated for our full sample of TA buildings (10.82 floors vs 14.29, see 
Table 4). Given the size of their standard errors it is not possible to be absolutely certain that 
the Chicago and London effects of the award of TA status are significantly different: but it is 
highly probable that they are12. 
 
So while the sample is necessarily small in both cities, the results support our hypotheses 
quite strongly. The evidence from this quasi-natural experiment – what happens to building 
heights when an architect achieves TA status – provides highly suggestive support of our 
interpretation: that in the specific conditions of London TA status has powerful signalling 
power of architectural merit and is used to gain the rents created by a highly restrictive but 
gameable planning system. 
 
IV.ii Plausible alternatives 
 
Following extensive consultation with colleagues and industry experts, we identified two 
alternative plausible reasons why TAs might be favoured for designing tall buildings. The 
first is that firms wanting to build prestigious headquarters and make a statement may both 
build tall and employ a TA to do so. Another possibility is that the technical skills required to 
design and build tall buildings are rare and highly skewed in their distribution to TAs. These 
                                                 
12 An even simpler test is just to estimate for each city’s set of buildings the change in floors associated with the 
architect gaining TA status. In London this is an additional 11.92 floor with a standard error of 2.975: in 
Chicago, 5.256 fewer floors with a standard error of 6.999. 
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two alternative causal explanations are explored in detail in Appendix 3, where we first 
compare the bespoke status (that is buildings commissioned by a firm for its own occupation) 
of all the ‘tall’ – over 20 story – modern TA buildings in London. We find no evidence that 
either tall or TA buildings are systematically more likely to be bespoke. It appears, therefore, 
not to be the case that the exceptionally high frequency of TA design for tall buildings in 
London is because tall buildings are commissioned by the companies occupying them to 
‘make a statement’.  
 
To explore the second possible explanation – that only TAs have the capability to build tall – 
Table A6 compares the tallest buildings in five international cities, selected because they are 
known to have less restrictive land use regulatory systems than London. Across these five 
cities only 2.3 per cent of tall buildings were designed by TAs compared to 25 percent in 
London. Moreover in the two least regulated cities, Brussels (which had the lowest estimated 
level of regulatory tax of any European office centre in Cheshire and Hilber, 2008) and 
Benidorm, not a single tall building was designed by a TA. Clearly the expertise necessary to 
design tall buildings is not restricted to architects who qualify as TAs by our definition. This 
second alternative explanation is also hard to reconcile with our specific definition of a 
‘Trophy Architect’, which necessarily implies that buildings which were designed by a TA 
before they won a relevant award are not classed as ‘TA buildings’. Therefore in practice 
different buildings by the same designer may have different ‘TA’ statuses. 
V. WHAT IS THE NET VALUE OF RENTS OBTAINABLE BY DESIGN? 
We have demonstrated that TAs may be able to generate more value both by building taller 
on a given site and because of the TA-premium per m2 their buildings command but they also 
cost more. Some of these extra costs can be estimated directly but most, as we argue below, 
are likely to be hidden because they represent delays in securing permission and extra risks 
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for a project including, of course, the risk that no permission will be forthcoming. We first 
look at those costs we can directly estimate. 
 
From Table 4 we can assume that TA-buildings outside a HPA will be some 14 floors taller 
than SA buildings. This would mean that employing a TA would allow a developer to go 
from a typical allowable building height of 7 floors to 21. Our task here is to estimate how 
valuable this increase in floorspace is to a developer allowing for the extra costs, explicitly 
associated with TA building and design. To address this we apply cost and net floorspace 
data obtained from Gardiner & Theobald (G&T) for a hypothetical building in the City of 
London with characteristics approximating the sample median for this location: 8 floors (not 
7 as for the sample as a whole), a 2000m2 site area and 1600m2 footprint. We then compare 
these cost and net floorspace estimates with those derived from the methodology of Ahlfeldt 
and McMillen (2018), henceforth referred to as ‘A&M’. 
 
TAs charge a premium for their services compared to SAs, and the buildings they design on 
average incur additional construction costs both because they are taller and because their unit 
costs per m2 are higher. G&T provided estimates of the total construction costs for a standard 
office building and more expensive TA designs, as well as estimates for the loss of net 
internal area as office buildings increase in height.  
 
Using the sample median characteristics of office buildings in the City of London, the 
coefficients in Table 6, Model 4, and the estimated selling price (including the TA-premium) 
of a TA building, we calculated a sale-price/m2 time-series for these hypothetical buildings at 
8 and 22 floors across the study period. The results are displayed in Figure 3 along with 
estimates for the cost/m2 of expensive TA and SA buildings by number of floors. 
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Figure 3 about here: Price per m2 and construction costs for representative TA building 
in City 
As we can see, estimated price per m2 was highly cyclical but always well above TA building 
costs, suggesting that a considerable rent could have been earned by using a TA at any time 
between 1997 and 2018. These achievable TA rents also appear to have trended higher over 
time.  
 
Given this data we can estimate both the value of surpluses (not profits since this will include 
the price bid for land, rent-seeking costs, etc.) and the components of those surpluses 
generated by an SA or a TA for 8- and 22-floor buildings. In the case of a TA the components 
are the result of additional surpluses accruing from (i) the increase in space and (ii) from the 
TA-premium accounting for the additional direct costs TA design entails.  
 
Table 9 about here: SA and TA height and surpluses according to Gardiner & 
Theobald (G&T) and Ahlfeldt & McMillen (A&M) 
  
As shown in Table 9, assuming the market price for office space is £14,000/m2, and 
following G&T’s costs and net floorspace protocols, an 8-floor SA building will generate a 
£110m surplus while a TA design of 22-floors will generate a total surplus of £326m. The 
difference between the 8-floor SA and 22-floor TA implies a gain of £216m from using a TA. 
The additional surplus accruing to the 22-floor TA building of £216m can be further broken 
down into a TA price premium (£81m) representing a productivity gain, and the value 
contributed by the increase in 14 additional floors as the residual (£135m) – a rent.  
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By contrast, the total economic rent theoretically available to an SA if they were able to build 
to the profit maximising height of 117-floors instead of 8 is £783m – £110m = £673m. This 
suggests that for a new office building in the City of London, by restricting heights to 8-
floors as opposed to the profit maximizing 117 there is foregone rent of £673m. TAs in the 
right location, however, are able to claw-back some £135m of this through height 
concessions from planners. These, however, are strictly partial equilibrium calculations: if 
height restrictions were removed for the market as a whole, the consequent increase in the 
market-wide supply of space, and fall in its price, would significantly reduce the profit 
maximizing building height – and of course eliminate TA rents and deadweight losses. 
 
Using the G&T cost estimates the additional cost of the 22-floor TA building relative to a 22-
floor SA building is £14m: on A&M cost estimates only £6m. In practice some fraction of 
this £14m, say ‘p’, will comprise opportunity costs and therefore represent a deadweight loss, 
and the remaining fraction will represent a pure transfer to TAs and perhaps construction 
firms. The magnitude of ‘p’ will depend upon the particular works these firms undertake 
relative to a standard 22-floor building and the competitiveness of the TA and construction 
markets.  
 
Given the apparent substantial rents (£135m) to be earned from hiring a TA to build tall, the 
natural question to ask is why do not all developers with land outside HPAs seek (and 
acquire) rents this way? In the context which we are analysing, the most plausible answer is 
that since there are no £50 notes lying around on the pavement, let alone £135 million pound 
notes, there is ‘complete rent dissipation’. As was argued in Cheshire and Hilber (2008) there 
is good evidence that the development industry in London is competitive – a similar 
conclusion to that reached by Glaeser et al. (2005) in their analysis of the extent of the 
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regulatory tax in Manhattan. This suggest that in equilibrium expected actual profits are the 
same regardless of whether a TA or a SA is employed. All rents are dissipated in rent-seeking 
activity of one sort or another. 
 
The estimates of rents made so far, however, assume no extra costs beyond those associated 
with actual design and construction. There are, however, likely to be at least three additional 
and important sources of cost. The first is extra costs negotiating a way through the process 
of development control ultimately to obtain permission to build, including the professional 
fees and expenses involved plus the financing and opportunity costs of the extra delay this 
imposes. The second is the possibility that TA designed buildings have certain financial 
penalties associated with them. The third is more intangible. It is the higher expected rate of 
return that would be required by the developer to offset the greater risks that trying – and 
perhaps failing – to game the system.  
 
We provide some admittedly fragmentary evidence in Appendix 4 that supports the view that 
applications for tall buildings designed by TAs take 6-18 months longer to process, and that 
space in large buildings takes 28-60 months longer to fully let. Although we are not able to 
estimate the costs of additional planning delay, we do find that the cost imposed by longer 
letting-times would reduce the profit of our representative TA building by £9m. Note that all 
three such costs should be regarded as deadweight losses. Assuming these costs completely 
dissipate rents and adding the £6 to £14m extra cost associated with using a TA yields an 
upper limit for the gross surplus or available rent of £216m-£230m. If we then net out the 
productive £81m TA floorspace premium, we arrive at an estimate of the net deadweight loss 
of £135m-£149m. 
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However, from a social welfare perspective these estimates ignore any external benefits that 
could be associated with TA design.  We have already investigated but found no evidence of 
productive externalities (views of, or proximity to, TA buildings increasing the price of other 
buildings) but there could be social value to residents or tourists from viewing such buildings. 
There is evidence that both historic and modern architecture create some external benefit for 
residents (Koster and Rouwendal, 2017; Ahlfeldt and Maennig, 2010; Ahlfeldt and Mastro, 
2012). So this potential source of external benefit has to be weighed against our estimate of 
the gross value of deadweight losses. . While the evidence for such external benefits 
associated with TA designed commercial buildings is sparse, nevertheless we should note 
that in so far as they exist, they imply that our £135 to £149m would clearly be an upper 




We have come a long way to answering one of the questions posed at the start: why does the 
incidence of tall buildings vary so much across cities? London has very few because of very 
tight regulation combined with high costs in negotiating exceptions by using a TA. While it is 
a partial equilibrium result, the profit maximizing height for a new office building in the City 
of London, if such a building could be built employing a SA, would be 117-floors. We 
observe that ‘normal’ new office buildings average 8-floors. That such a tall building would 
be profit maximizing reflects the tight restrictions on London’s supply of office space 
investigated in Cheshire and Hilber (2008). 
 
This paper provides evidence consistent with Krueger’s 1974 analysis. If you have a system 
of regulation which imposes quantitative restrictions on the supply of some ‘good’ it will 
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create rents, which actors will then compete for. In the quasi-discretionary planning system 
operating in London we find that developers seem to be able to appropriate those rents 
literally by design(er). They can employ TAs who, where the regime is at all flexible – that is 
in the areas not absolutely but discretionally regulated for height – can use their prestige to 
signal superior aesthetic quality and persuade planners and politicians to permit more 
building space on a given site, notably by allowing a taller building. Moreover, we have 
found quite persuasive evidence from the comparison with Chicago suggesting that it is not 
the intrinsic quality of the design so much as the signalling power of a major lifetime 
achievement award which is responsible for this effect. In London, unlike the far less 
restrictively regulated Chicago, the receipt of TA status is associated with the architects’ 
subsequent buildings ‘growing’ by some 11 floors in the specification we judge most 
persuasive.  
 
Even allowing for the additional direct costs entailed in building to a TA design, the extra 
space a TA can generate on a given site increases the profits of their typical buildings. On a 
representative site this is worth an estimated £216m of which £135 appears to represent rents 
while £81m represents the additional premium TA designed space commands.  The results 
from Table 7 provide an alternative way of estimating a TA’s addition to site value: an 
increase of 152 percent. However, while £135m may be a best estimate of the value of the 
rents that employing a TA appears to generate, if we turn the telescope around the other way 
and assume that large denomination bank notes are not lying around on the pavements of 
London to be picked up, this £135m can be interpreted as simply a measure of the costs 
imposed by the planning system if it is to be gamed successfully: the cost of rent acquisition 
using a TA. Thus £135m combined with up to £14m in extra construction costs represents the 
upper bound estimate for the gross deadweight losses associated with TA design of a single 
"Trophy Architects" and design as rent-seeking: 
Quantifying deadweight losses in a tightly regulated office market 
36 
 
building. However, it omits any external social value which a TA building might also 
generate and only a fraction of the £14m extra costs may represent a true deadweight costs. 
 
Certainly seeking and acquiring rents by employing a TA has costs, most of which (such as 
employing lawyers and planning specialists to pursue appeals against initial rejections or 
additional risk premiums) are deadweight losses; and if there is a case for more high quality 
architecture than the market will deliver, London almost certainly uses a suboptimal method 
of generating that increase. The current planning regime also delivers any residual rents more 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of data used in building size regressions 
 
Distribution of Sample by Decade built and Local Planning Authority  
 
            
Decade Built Pre-1950 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s                  
No. 977 92 106 121 263 194 187 99                  
LPA Camden City of 
London 
Westminster Hackney Hammersmith Islington Kensington Lambeth Southwark Tower 
Hamlets 
Docklands Wandsworth           
No. 260 495 736 61 45 165 48 19 128 43 37 2           
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of data used in hedonic regressions 
 
Decade Built Pre-1950 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s         
No. 1,219 125 140 174 393 312 283 93         
Year Sold 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011   
No. 37 55 41 56 85 87 81 93 121 119 76 77 98 92   
Year Sold 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018          
No. 242 291 253 214 231 184 206          
LPA Camden City of 
London 
Westminster Hackney Hammersmith Islington Kensington Lambeth Southwark Tower 
Hamlets 
Docklands Wandsworth  
No. 328 779 948 71 67 210 57 24 145 62 44 4  
Submarket City Core City 
Fringe 






West End     
No. 684 312 44 427 90 69 104 141 868     
 
  
 N Mean Median St. Dev. Maximum Minimum 
TA Bldg 105      
Modern TA 64      
Pre-Modern TA 41      
Modern TA Bldg Built outside HPA 27      
Floorspace (m2) 2,039 6,252 2,262 11,189 113,665 150 
Floors (All buildings) 2,039 7.57 7 4.49 90 3 
Floors (Standard architect only) 2,039      
Footprint (m2) 2,039 1,139 816 1,477 16,266 50 
Site area (m2) 2,039 1,283 913 1,795 22,129 53 
Floorspace/site area 2,039 4.29 3.90 2.53 26.02 0.22 
Footprint/site area 2,039 0.95 1.00 0.13 1.00 0.09 
Average Employment 600m 2,039 41,564 36,547 30,300 129,947 0 
Built in HPA 598      
Listed 386      
 N Mean Median St. Dev. Maximum Minimum 
TA Bldg 186      
Modern TA 65      
Pre-Modern TA 121      
Modern TA Bldg Built outside HPA 26      
Price (£m) 2,739 55.56 22.00 97.11 1,285.50 0.42 
Price (£)/ Floorspace (m2) 2,739 9,084 7,568 7,169 93,287 509 
Price (£)/ Site area (m2) 2,739 40,206 30,777 36,189 453,932 627 
Floorspace (m2) 2,739 6,805 2,967 10,522 113,665 151 
Floors 2,739 7.81 7.00 4.12 55 3 
Footprint (m2) 2,739 1,243 966 1,460 16,266 50 
Site area (m2) 2,739 1,393 1,077 1,719 16,266 53 
Floorspace/site area 2,739 4.50 4.11 2.65 28.17 0.22 
Footprint/site area 2,739 0.94 1.00 0.13 1.00 0.09 
Employment Density 600m 2,739 47,832 42,332 33,750 144,386 0 
Sold while in HPA 2,105      
Built in HPA 838      
Listed 462      
Distribution of Sample between Decade built, Year Sold, Local Planning Authority, and Submarket 
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Table 3: Can TAs build bigger? Dep. Var.: Total floorspace/ site area 











      
Modern TA outside HPA  7.193*** 6.332*** 5.565*** 5.422*** 
  (1.307) (1.287) (1.204) (1.192) 
TA 1.940*** 0.0884 -0.0640 -0.0124 -0.0116 
 (0.479) (0.211) (0.208) (0.207) (0.210) 
Built in HPA 0.432*** 0.531*** -0.141 0.167 0.0758 
 (0.118) (0.112) (0.170) (0.160) (0.157) 
Average Office Permission Refusal Rate -10.39*** -10.31*** -10.10*** -8.335*** -7.448*** 
 (0.985) (0.956) (0.940) (2.064) (2.029) 
Decade Built NO NO YES YES YES 
City of London    0.257 -1.025*** 
    (0.270) (0.296) 
Docklands    3.796*** 3.727*** 
    (0.857) (0.827) 
Average Employment 600m     2.44e-05*** 
     (2.77e-06) 
Constant 5.074*** 5.037*** 4.803*** 4.574*** 3.749*** 
 (0.124) (0.121) (0.121) (0.265) (0.279) 
      
Observations 2,039 2,039 2,039 2,039 2,039 
R-squared 0.095 0.174 0.206 0.239 0.269 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: Can TAs build taller? Dep. Var.: No. of floors above ground level 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Floors Floors Floors 
    
Modern TA outside HPA 15.50*** 14.43*** 14.29*** 
 (3.509) (3.505) (3.512) 
TA 0.882*** 0.951*** 0.952*** 
 (0.327) (0.329) (0.334) 
Built in HPA -1.157*** -0.725** -0.818** 
 (0.350) (0.325) (0.326) 
Average Office Permission Refusal Rate -13.26*** -11.32*** -10.42*** 
 (1.555) (3.359) (3.355) 
Decade Built YES YES YES 
City of London  0.284 -1.019** 
  (0.453) (0.476) 
Docklands  5.297*** 5.227*** 
  (1.777) (1.756) 
Average Employment 600m   2.48e-05*** 
   (4.38e-06) 
Constant 7.730*** 7.477*** 6.639*** 
 (0.169) (0.418) (0.448) 
    
Observations 2,039 2,039 2,039 
R-squared 0.331 0.351 0.361 
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Table 5: Can TAs get a bigger building footprint? Dep. Var.: Footprint/ site area 
 









     
Modern TA outside HPA 0.107 0.103 0.0944 0.139* 
 (0.0682) (0.0706) (0.0718) (0.0767) 
TA -0.0618*** -0.0624*** -0.0624*** -0.0594*** 
 (0.0143) (0.0142) (0.0138) (0.0139) 
Built in HPA 0.0535*** 0.0571*** 0.0519*** 0.0494*** 
 (0.00878) (0.00939) (0.00921) (0.00917) 
Average Office Permission Refusal Rate -0.290*** -0.489*** -0.438** -0.471*** 
 (0.0590) (0.176) (0.171) (0.168) 
Built 1950s -0.0225* -0.0211 -0.0134 -0.0106 
 (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0130) (0.0130) 
Built 1960s -0.0782*** -0.0781*** -0.0731*** -0.0615*** 
 (0.0189) (0.0190) (0.0189) (0.0177) 
Built 1970s -0.0537*** -0.0532*** -0.0484*** -0.0418*** 
 (0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0140) (0.0136) 
Built 1980s -0.0763*** -0.0773*** -0.0696*** -0.0668*** 
 (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0121) (0.0121) 
Built 1990s -0.0605*** -0.0636*** -0.0562*** -0.0519*** 
 (0.0119) (0.0127) (0.0124) (0.0126) 
Built 2000s -0.0483*** -0.0513*** -0.0447*** -0.0360*** 
 (0.0117) (0.0124) (0.0123) (0.0123) 
Built 2010s -0.0233 -0.0229 -0.0126 0.00141 
 (0.0174) (0.0175) (0.0180) (0.0198) 
City of London  -0.0286 -0.102*** -0.105*** 
  (0.0199) (0.0232) (0.0229) 
Docklands  0.0296 0.0257 0.0420 
  (0.0255) (0.0250) (0.0274) 
Average Employment 600m   1.40e-06*** 1.47e-06*** 
   (1.78e-07) (1.77e-07) 
Floors    -0.00313** 
    (0.00128) 
Constant 0.993*** 1.018*** 0.971*** 0.991*** 
 (0.00661) (0.0209) (0.0202) (0.0211) 
     
Observations 2,039 2,039 2,039 2,039 
R-squared 0.061 0.064 0.100 0.107 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TA 0.158***  0.138***  
 (0.0393)  (0.0395)  
Modern TA  0.223***  0.167** 
  (0.0647)  (0.0665) 
Pre-Modern TA  0.123**  0.125*** 
  (0.0484)  (0.0482) 
Sold while in HPA 0.0809*** 0.0813*** 0.0889*** 0.0892*** 
 (0.0246) (0.0246) (0.0246) (0.0246) 
Listed 0.0545** 0.0596** 0.0520* 0.0539** 
 (0.0272) (0.0275) (0.0271) (0.0275) 
Ln(Office Permission Refusal Rate 9yr Moving Average) 0.0441*** 0.0437*** 0.0434*** 0.0433*** 
 (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0105) 
Ln(Employment 600m) 0.168*** 0.167*** 0.173*** 0.172*** 
 (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0159) (0.0159) 
Ln(Listed Building Density 300m) 0.0332*** 0.0338*** 0.0341*** 0.0342*** 
 (0.00780) (0.00783) (0.00779) (0.00781) 
Office Grade A/B 0.0656** 0.0660** 0.0672** 0.0680** 
 (0.0313) (0.0313) (0.0312) (0.0313) 
Office Grade A 0.214*** 0.214*** 0.213*** 0.214*** 
 (0.0348) (0.0348) (0.0347) (0.0347) 
Ln(Percent Occupied) 0.0271*** 0.0272*** 0.0277*** 0.0277*** 
 (0.00520) (0.00520) (0.00518) (0.00518) 
Ln(Floorspace m2) 0.947*** 0.945*** 0.933*** 0.933*** 
 (0.00941) (0.00944) (0.00998) (0.01000) 
Floors 11-20   0.127*** 0.127*** 
   (0.0374) (0.0375) 
Floors 21-30   0.00731 0.00438 
   (0.0986) (0.0988) 
Floors 31+   0.459*** 0.445*** 
   (0.125) (0.128) 
Decade Build YES YES YES YES 
Submarket YES YES YES YES 
Year Sold YES YES YES YES 
Constant -7.723*** -7.713*** -7.694*** -7.687*** 
 (0.245) (0.245) (0.246) (0.246) 
     
Observations 2,739 2,739 2,739 2,739 
R-squared 0.880 0.880 0.881 0.881 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7: What value does a TA add to a site? Dep. var.: ln(price/site area m2) 
 







    
Modern TA outside HPA 0.736*** 0.771*** 0.774*** 
 (0.206) (0.202) (0.151) 
Modern TA 0.270*** 0.173** 0.149** 
 (0.0702) (0.0753) (0.0685) 
Pre-Modern TA 0.213** 0.222** 0.157* 
 (0.0919) (0.0929) (0.0911) 
Sold while in HPA 0.0405 0.0494 0.0306 
 (0.0351) (0.0346) (0.0334) 
Listed -0.0204 0.00621 -0.0801** 
 (0.0410) (0.0417) (0.0396) 
Ln(Office Permission Refusal Rate 9yr Moving Average) 0.0446*** 0.0473*** 0.0239* 
 (0.0158) (0.0161) (0.0136) 
Ln(Employment 600m) 0.246*** 0.247*** 0.238*** 
 (0.0442) (0.0448) (0.0711) 
Ln(Listed Building Density 300m) 0.0899*** 0.0899*** 0.0558*** 
 (0.0129) (0.0128) (0.0121) 
Office Grade A/B 0.115** 0.103** 0.167*** 
 (0.0454) (0.0456) (0.0414) 
Office Grade A 0.564*** 0.520*** 0.490*** 
 (0.0486) (0.0510) (0.0461) 
Ln(Percent Occupied) 0.0455*** 0.0449*** 0.0463*** 
 (0.00873) (0.00868) (0.00801) 
Decade Built NO YES YES 
Submarket NO NO YES 
Year Sold YES YES YES 
Constant 6.120*** 6.107*** 6.106*** 
 (0.425) (0.431) (0.775) 
    
Observations 2,739 2,739 2,739 
R-squared 0.356 0.360 0.451 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 8: The impact on building heights of gaining TA status in London compared to 
Chicago 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Floors Floors Floors 
Omit 1 Canada 
Square 
Floors 
Omit 1 Canada 
Square 
     
Modern TA outside HPA 13.12*** 8.719** 14.37*** 10.82*** 
 (3.735) (3.895) (3.536) (3.141) 
Chicago TA -7.156 -4.400 -8.259 -6.430 
 (6.414) (7.604) (6.341) (7.499) 
TA 0.209 -1.303 1.367 0.320 
 (1.644) (2.309) (1.223) (1.572) 
Built in HPA -1.344 -5.046 0.421 -2.223 
 (2.004) (3.598) (0.930) (2.051) 
Chicago 32.23*** 27.28*** 34.58*** 31.57*** 
 (5.773) (6.494) (5.266) (5.071) 
Decade Built NO YES NO YES 
Constant 7.617*** 4.429*** 5.208*** 4.429*** 
 (2.510) (0.785) (0.653) (0.786) 
     
Observations 87 87 86 86 
R-squared 0.474 0.505 0.516 0.539 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 9: SA and TA height and surpluses according to Gardiner & Theobald (G&T) 
and Ahlfeldt & McMillen (A&M) 
Standard Architect      





Floors 8 22 22 117 117 
Net Internal Area 10,203 26,853 23,854 110,649 109,327 
Total Costs 32,814,237 104,856,390 46,177,432 766,214,185 477,863,151 
Sale Price 142,848,000 375,936,000 333,952,084 1,549,080,000 1,530,574,297 
Surplus 110,033,763 271,079,610 287,774,652 782,865,815 1,052,711,145 
Trophy Architect      





Floors 8 22 22 122 119 
Net Internal Area 10,203 26,853 23,854 113,634 111,028 
Total Costs 37,048,054 118,516,283 52,159,705 913,942,603 567,658,681 
Sale Price 168,811,233 444,263,971 394,649,300 1,880,029,226 1,836,908,637 
Surplus 131,763,179 325,747,688 342,489,595 966,086,623 1,269,249,955 
"Trophy Architects" and design as rent-seeking: 




MAPS & FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: The 546 postcode sectors and 2,039 office locations 
 
 
Figure 2: Height Protected Areas (HPAs) 
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Appendix I: Estates Gazette’s London Office Submarket Definitions by Postcode District 
 
City Core: EC1A, EC2M, EC2N, EC2R, EC2Y, EC2V, EC2A (only Finsbury Pavement, 
Finsbury Square, Appold Street and Chiswell Street), EC3, EC4 (excluding EC4A & EC4Y) 
City Fringe: EC1M, EC1N (excluding postcode sector 2), EC1R, EC1V, EC1Y, EC2A 
(excluding Finsbury Pavement, Finsbury Square, Appold Street and Chiswell Street), E1 
Southbank: SE1 postcode sectors 0, 1, 2 & 9 
Docklands: E14 
Midtown: EC4A & EC4Y, EC1N (sector 2), WC1, WC2 (excluding Leicester Square) 
West End: W1, SW1, NW1 sectors 2 (Euston Road only), 3, 5 & 6, Leicester Square (WC2) 
and W2 sectors 1, 2 & 6 
South Central: Remainder of SE1 and all of SE11 
North Central: Remainder of NW1 and N1 and all of E8 
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Appendix 2: Dropping the Tallest/Largest Buildings from the Sample 
Table A1: Robustness: Successively omitting largest (floorspace/site area) three TA buildings: Dep. 
var.: floorspace/site m2 









Omit 2 Greatest 
Floorspace/ 
Site Area 
Omit 3 Greatest 
     
Modern TA outside HPA 5.422*** 5.013*** 4.494*** 3.866*** 
 (1.192) (1.156) (1.075) (0.914) 
TA -0.0116 -0.0124 -0.00328 0.00833 
 (0.210) (0.210) (0.209) (0.209) 
Built in HPA 0.0758 0.0607 0.0819 0.0346 
 (0.157) (0.157) (0.156) (0.149) 
Average Office Permission Refusal Rate -7.448*** -7.397*** -7.272*** -7.027*** 
 (2.029) (2.028) (2.028) (2.019) 
Built 1950s 0.186 0.194 0.192 0.208 
 (0.180) (0.180) (0.180) (0.180) 
Built 1960s 0.756*** 0.764*** 0.760*** 0.781*** 
 (0.241) (0.241) (0.240) (0.240) 
Built 1970s 0.610*** 0.620*** 0.615*** 0.642*** 
 (0.233) (0.232) (0.231) (0.228) 
Built 1980s 0.201 0.221 0.212 0.236 
 (0.163) (0.161) (0.161) (0.159) 
Built 1990s 0.318* 0.354* 0.345* 0.375** 
 (0.185) (0.182) (0.182) (0.181) 
Built 2000s 1.362*** 1.345*** 1.352*** 1.405*** 
 (0.238) (0.236) (0.236) (0.230) 
Built 2010s 1.556*** 1.604*** 1.493*** 1.418*** 
 (0.424) (0.422) (0.410) (0.403) 
City of London -1.025*** -1.018*** -0.998*** -0.961*** 
 (0.296) (0.296) (0.296) (0.294) 
Docklands 3.727*** 3.453*** 3.543*** 3.621*** 
 (0.827) (0.797) (0.795) (0.793) 
Average Employment 600m 2.44e-05*** 2.45e-05*** 2.40e-05*** 2.42e-05*** 
 (2.77e-06) (2.77e-06) (2.72e-06) (2.71e-06) 
Constant 3.749*** 3.740*** 3.743*** 3.704*** 
 (0.279) (0.279) (0.279) (0.277) 
     
Observations 2,039 2,038 2,037 2,036 
R-squared 0.269 0.253 0.242 0.236 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table A1 successively removes the TA buildings with the greatest (Floorspace/Site Area) ratio in the 
sample. These are 8 Canada Square (26.02), ‘The Cheesegrater’ 122 Leadenhall (25.04), and ‘The Shard’ 
32 London Bridge Street (23.62). 
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Table A2: Robustness: Successively omitting tallest three TA buildings: Dep. var.: No. floors 






Omit 2 Tallest 
Floors 
Omit 3 Tallest 
     
Modern TA outside HPA 14.29*** 11.59*** 10.30*** 9.468*** 
 (3.512) (2.390) (2.077) (1.987) 
TA 0.952*** 1.004*** 1.027*** 1.027*** 
 (0.334) (0.331) (0.330) (0.330) 
Built in HPA -0.818** -1.037*** -0.989*** -1.019*** 
 (0.326) (0.249) (0.245) (0.243) 
Average Office Permission Refusal Rate -10.42*** -9.330*** -9.005*** -8.888*** 
 (3.355) (3.119) (3.080) (3.067) 
Built 1950s 0.890*** 0.964*** 0.959*** 0.975*** 
 (0.285) (0.270) (0.266) (0.265) 
Built 1960s 3.713*** 3.806*** 3.797*** 3.815*** 
 (0.676) (0.672) (0.673) (0.673) 
Built 1970s 2.127*** 2.251*** 2.239*** 2.260*** 
 (0.401) (0.382) (0.382) (0.382) 
Built 1980s 0.889*** 0.998*** 0.976*** 1.014*** 
 (0.267) (0.241) (0.238) (0.234) 
Built 1990s 1.357*** 1.490*** 1.466*** 1.536*** 
 (0.317) (0.292) (0.293) (0.289) 
Built 2000s 2.789*** 3.035*** 3.058*** 3.030*** 
 (0.430) (0.355) (0.355) (0.353) 
Built 2010s 4.462*** 4.131*** 3.851*** 3.931*** 
 (0.801) (0.731) (0.679) (0.673) 
City of London -1.019** -0.855* -0.804* -0.791* 
 (0.476) (0.440) (0.435) (0.433) 
Docklands 5.227*** 5.613*** 5.862*** 5.355*** 
 (1.756) (1.737) (1.735) (1.702) 
Average Employment 600m 2.48e-05*** 2.58e-05*** 2.46e-05*** 2.48e-05*** 
 (4.38e-06) (4.26e-06) (4.09e-06) (4.08e-06) 
Constant 6.639*** 6.461*** 6.464*** 6.443*** 
 (0.448) (0.406) (0.403) (0.402) 
     
Observations 2,039 2,038 2,037 2,036 
R-squared 0.361 0.365 0.350 0.331 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table A2 successively removes the TA buildings from the sample in order of most above ground floors. 
These are ‘The Shard’ 32 London Bridge Street (87F), ‘The Cheesegrater’ 122 Leadenhall Street (48F), 
and 25 Canada Square (45F). 
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Appendix 3: Causal Interpretation of Relationship between TA Design and Additional 
Stories? 
 
As discussed in Section 5 of the paper we identified two possible objections to the causal 
interpretation we have put onto the strong relationship between whether a building is in a non-
HPA and designed by a modern TA, on the one hand, and its additional height and resulting 
increased value of the site all else controlled for, on the other. The first of these objections is 
that companies wishing to make a landmark statement may tend to commission both taller 
buildings and TAs to be their designers. The second is that designing tall buildings is 
particularly demanding of architectural skill so tall buildings are more likely to be designed by 
famous – or trophy – architects. 
 
The crux of the first objection to our interpretation of causation is that bespoke developments 
must both cause (i) buildings to be tall and (ii) TAs to be chosen as their architect. If either of 
these is false, then the bespoke status of developments cannot be an explanation of why TA 
buildings are taller than those of ‘normal’ architects. 
 
To address the first of these relationships, we take TA status as given13 and determine whether 
bespoke status can influence building height. Table A3 below shows that there have been 59 
modern office buildings built by TAs in London. Of these 59, 20 (or 34 percent), were 
commissioned to be built by a firm specifically for their own use. Following our earlier 
analyses, Table A4 shows a series of hierarchical regressions on the height of modern TA 
buildings depending on bespoke status and a number of controls. Under none of the 
specifications is the bespoke variable a statistically significant determinant of building height. 
Robust standard errors are shown because heteroskedasticity is identified in the data with a 
White test; homoskedastic standard errors yield the same result. 
 
Tables A3 & A4 about here 
 
To address the second necessary assumption that bespoke developments preferentially choose 
TA designers, we now take tall building status as given14 and determine whether bespoke status 
                                                 
13 We imposed this restriction to ensure the feasibility of data collection. 
14 Again so as to make data collection feasible. 
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influences the likelihood of choosing a TA. Table A5 shows the 47 office buildings in London 
that have ever been built above 20 floors, and of these 20, or 43 percent, were bespoke. Now 
examining TAs, 13 of these 47 buildings were designed by TAs, and of these TA buildings 6, 
or 46 percent, were also bespoke. A comparison of means test does not reject the null 
hypothesis that among London’s tallest offices the probability that a given (TA or non-TA) 
building will be bespoke is identical to the probability that a TA building specifically will be 
bespoke (p=0.80). Therefore bespoke developments do not appear to be either taller (necessary 
assumption 1) or to preferentially choose TA designers (necessary assumption 2). Either of 
these findings alone would be sufficient to invalidate the inference that bespoke status accounts 
for our observed relationship between TAs and building height, but together this conclusion is 
stronger still. 
 
Table A5 about here 
 
As a way of addressing the second potential criticism of our causal interpretation – that only 
TAs have the requisite skills to design tall buildings, Table A6 provides data on tall buildings 
from a selection of cities around the world. These cities are selected because they have 
comparatively flexible restrictions on building tall. They are: Chicago, Houston, Brussels, 
Benidorm (Spain), and Sao Paulo. Chicago and Houston are at the least restrictive end of the 
US spectrum of restrictiveness with respect to commercial buildings at least. Brussels was the 
office centre in Western Europe identified by Cheshire and Hilber (2008) as having the lowest 
estimated value of Regulatory Tax. Benidorm, especially when it was developed as a resort 
town during the 1970s and 1980s, had both lax restriction and lax enforcement, and while Sao 
Paolo does have significant restrictions on very tall buildings it is quite unrestrictive with 
respect to buildings up to 100 meters. The sample of buildings in these cities consisted of those 
buildings above 100m: corresponding to roughly 25-floors. 
 
 
Table A6 about here 
 
 
We can see that only a small fraction (2.3 percent) of the tallest buildings in these five 
international cities was designed by a TA, and that this fraction is an order of magnitude lower 
than in London. There are also no TA buildings at all in Brussels or Benidorm – both cities 
with a far higher incidence of tall buildings per capita than London. A comparison of means 
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test rejects with high confidence the probability that there is no difference between the 
incidence of tall TA buildings in London and the other cities (p<0.0001). This result contradicts 
the idea that only TAs have the skills to build tall. It is also suggestive that there is a unique 
process at work in London which associates tall buildings with TAs: we argue that this process 




Table A7 about here 
 
 
Table A3: Are bespoke buildings taller? Population of Modern TA office buildings in London (n=59) 
Building Name Address TA Award Floors Year 
Approved 
Borough Bespoke 
‘The Shard’ 32 London Bridge 
Street 
Renzo Piano RIBA Gold 1989, 
AIA Gold 2008, 
Pritzker 1998 
87 2003 Southwark NO 
‘The Cheesegrater’ 122 Leadenhall Richard Rogers RIBA Gold 1985, 
Pritzker 2007 
50 2004 City of London NO 
 25 Canada Square 
 
Cesar Pelli AIA Gold 1995 45 1998 Tower Hamlets YES 
 8 Canada Square Norman Foster RIBA Gold 1983, 
AIA Gold 1994, 
Pritzker 1999 
45 1997 Tower Hamlets YES 
 30 St Mary Axe Norman Foster RIBA Gold 1983, 
AIA Gold 1994, 
Pritzker 1999 
40 1997 City of London YES 
 25 Bank Street 
 
Cesar Pelli AIA Gold 1995 33 2001 Tower Hamlets NO 
 40 Bank Street 
 
Cesar Pelli AIA Gold 1995 33 2001 Tower Hamlets NO 
Willis Building 51 Lime Street Norman Foster RIBA Gold 1983, 
AIA Gold 1994, 
Pritzker 1999 
26 2002 City of London YES 
Shell Centre 2 York Road 
 
Howard Robertson RIBA Gold 1949 26 1957 Lambeth YES 
 33 Canada Square Norman Foster RIBA Gold 1983, 
AIA Gold 1994, 
Pritzker 1999 
24 1996 Tower Hamlets YES 
 1 Cabot Square Ieoh Ming Pei RIBA Gold 2010, 
AIA Gold 1979, 
Pritzker 1983 
21 1988 Tower Hamlets NO 
Bastion House 140 London Wall Phillip Powell & 
Hidalgo Moya 
RIBA Gold 1974 21 1974 City of London NO 
 12 Endeavour 
Square 
Richard Rogers RIBA Gold 1985, 
Pritzker 2007 
20 2015 Newham NO 
Moor House 120 London Wall Norman Foster RIBA Gold 1983, 
AIA Gold 1994, 
Pritzker 1999 
19 1998 City of London NO 
The Place 25 London Bridge 
Street 
Renzo Piano RIBA Gold 1989, 
AIA Gold 2008, 
Pritzker 1998 
18 2007 Southwark NO 
 88 Wood Street Richard Rogers RIBA Gold 1985, 
Pritzker 2007 
18 1995 City of London NO 
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Principal Place 115 Worship Street Norman Foster RIBA Gold 1983, 
AIA Gold 1994, 
Pritzker 1999 
17 2017 Hackney NO 
New Court St Swithin’s Lane Rem Koolhaas RIBA Gold 2004, 
Pritzker 2000 
16 2006 City of London YES 
Central St Giles 1-13 St Giles High 
Street 
Renzo Piano RIBA Gold 1989, 
AIA Gold 2008, 
Pritzker 1998 
15 2005 Camden NO 
New Lloyd’s 
Register of Shipping 
71 Fenchurch Street Richard Rogers RIBA Gold 1985, 
Pritzker 2007 
14 1996 City of London YES 
Fountain House 130 Fenchurch 
Street 
Howard Robertson RIBA Gold 1949 14 1956 City of London NO 
 5 Endeavour Square Richard Rogers RIBA Gold 1985, 
Pritzker 2007 
13 2015 Newham NO 
 10 Bishop’s Square Norman Foster RIBA Gold 1983, 
AIA Gold 1994, 
Pritzker 1999 
13 2001 Tower Hamlets NO 
 1 London Wall Norman Foster RIBA Gold 1983, 
AIA Gold 1994, 
Pritzker 1999 
13 2000 City of London NO 
Building 7 Chiswick Business 
Park 
Richard Rogers RIBA Gold 1985, 
Pritzker 2007 
12 2014 Hounslow NO 
Paddington 
Waterside 
35 North Wharf 
Road 
Richard Rogers RIBA Gold 1985, 
Pritzker 2007 
12 2001 Westminster NO 
 100 Liverpool 
Street 
Michael & Patricia 
Hopkins 
RIBA Gold 1994 11 2015 City of London NO 
Roman Wall House 1-2 Crutched Friars Michael & Patricia 
Hopkins 
RIBA Gold 1994 11 2014 City of London NO 
 100 Wood Street Norman Foster RIBA Gold 1983, 
AIA Gold 1994, 
Pritzker 1999 
11 1997 City of London NO 
Langbourne House 
 
10 Fenchurch Street Denys Lasdun RIBA Gold 1977 11 1982 City of London NO 
 1 More London 
Place 
Norman Foster RIBA Gold 1983, 
AIA Gold 1994, 
Pritzker 1999 
10 2000 Southwark YES 
 3 More London 
Place 
Norman Foster RIBA Gold 1983, 
AIA Gold 1994, 
Pritzker 1999 
10 2000 Southwark NO 
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Gibbs Building 215 Euston Road Michael & Patricia 
Hopkins 
RIBA Gold 1994 10 2000 Camden YES 
City Hall 110 The Queen’s 
Walk 
Norman Foster RIBA Gold 1983, 
AIA Gold 1994, 
Pritzker 1999 
10 1998 Southwark YES 
Reuter’s Building 1 Paul Julius Richard Rogers RIBA Gold 1985, 
Pritzker 2007 
10 1992 Tower Hamlets YES 
The Ark 
 
201 Talgarth Road Ralph Erskine RIBA Gold 1987 10 1989 Hammersmith NO 
ITN Building 200 Gray’s Inn 
Road 
Norman Foster RIBA Gold 1983, 
AIA Gold 1994, 
Pritzker 1999 
10 1989 Camden YES 
Board of Trade 
Building 
Whitehall Emmanuel Vincent 
Harries 
RIBA Gold 1951 10 1957 Westminster YES 
Holborn Place 33 Holborn Circus Norman Foster RIBA Gold 1983, 
AIA Gold 1994, 
Pritzker 1999 
9 1995 City of London NO 
Milton Gate 1 Moor Lane 
 
Denys Lasdun RIBA Gold 1977 9 1986 City of London NO 
Bloomberg Place 
Building 1 
50 Cannon Street Norman Foster RIBA Gold 1983, 
AIA Gold 1994, 
Pritzker 1999 
8 2012 City of London YES 
Bloomberg Place 
Building 2 
50 Cannon Street Norman Foster RIBA Gold 1983, 
AIA Gold 1994, 
Pritzker 1999 
8 2012 City of London YES 
The Walbrook 25 Walbrook Norman Foster RIBA Gold 1983, 
AIA Gold 1994, 
Pritzker 1999 
8 2007 City of London NO 
One New Change 9-36 Cheapside Jean Nouvel RIBA Gold 2001, 
Pritzker 2008 
8 2005 City of London NO 
 2 More London 
Place 
Norman Foster RIBA Gold 1983, 
AIA Gold 1994, 
Pritzker 1999 
8 2000 Southwark YES 
 4 More London 
Place 
Norman Foster RIBA Gold 1983, 
AIA Gold 1994, 
Pritzker 1999 
8 2000 Southwark NO 
 6 More London 
Place 
Norman Foster RIBA Gold 1983, 
AIA Gold 1994, 
Pritzker 1999 
8 2000 Southwark NO 
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 7 More London 
Place 
Norman Foster RIBA Gold 1983, 
AIA Gold 1994, 
Pritzker 1999 
8 2000 Southwark YES 
Tower Bridge House St Katharine’s 
Dock 
Richard Rogers RIBA Gold 1985, 
Pritzker 2007 
8 1999 Tower Hamlets NO 
 50 Finsbury Square Norman Foster RIBA Gold 1983, 
AIA Gold 1994, 
Pritzker 1999 
8 1998 Islington NO 
 10 Gresham Street Norman Foster RIBA Gold 1983, 
AIA Gold 1994, 
Pritzker 1999 
8 1997 City of London NO 
Tower Place West Tower Hill Norman Foster RIBA Gold 1983, 
AIA Gold 1994, 
Pritzker 1999 
7 1998 City of London NO 
Broadwick House 15-17 Broadwick 
Road 
Richard Rogers RIBA Gold 1985, 
Pritzker 2007 
7 1998 Westminster NO 
Stirling Square 1-5 Carlton 
Gardens 
James Stirling Pritzker 1981 7 1988 Westminster NO 
 1 Poultry 
 





Richard Rogers RIBA Gold 1985, 
Pritzker 2007 





Richard Rogers RIBA Gold 1985, 
Pritzker 2007 
5 1991 Westminster YES 
Francis Taylor 
Building 
Inner Temple Edward Maufe RIBA Gold 1944 5 1956 City of London YES 
 
 16 Winchester 
Walk 
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    Table A4: Bespoke status on Modern TA building height 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Floors Floors Floors Floors Floors 
      
Bespoke 1.527 1.817 -0.335 0.182 -3.047 
 (3.776) (3.746) (3.387) (3.368) (5.662) 
Built in HPA -8.175** -9.837** -6.102 -6.427 -4.172 
 (3.873) (4.129) (3.816) (3.900) (5.877) 
(Bespoke)×(Built Outside HPA)     7.250 
     (9.577) 
Average Office Permission Refusal Rate -3.119 -8.086 -36.41 -23.74 -12.79 
 (23.42) (24.46) (79.89) (88.83) (81.68) 
City of London   -3.974 -9.263 -8.200 
   (13.28) (12.09) (11.40) 
Docklands   17.59** 16.79** 16.01** 
   (6.598) (6.685) (6.907) 
Average Employment 600m    0.000117 0.000111 
Decade Permission Granted NO YES YES YES YES 
    (0.000109) (0.000118) 
Constant 21.00*** 12.39** 16.37 12.54 10.75 
 (3.346) (4.857) (13.42) (15.61) (14.62) 
      
Observations 59 59 59 59 59 





Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table A5: Are bespoke buildings designed by TAs? Population of London office buildings >20-floors (n=47) 




Local Authority Demolished 
‘The Shard’ 32 London Bridge Street Renzo Piano 
 
YES NO 87 310m 2012 Southwark - 
One Canada Square 1 Canada Square Cesar Pelli 
 
NO NO 50 235m 1991 Tower Hamlets - 
‘The Cheesegrater’ 122 Leadenhall Street Richard Rogers 
 
YES NO 48 225m 2014 City of London - 
Tower 42 25 Old Broad Street Richard Seifert 
 
NO YES 47 183m 1980 City of London - 
Heron Tower 110 Bishopsgate Kohn Pedersen Fox 
 
NO NO 46 203m 2011 City of London - 
HSBC Tower 8 Canada Square Norman Foster 
 
YES YES 45 200m 2002 Tower Hamlets - 
- 25 Canada Square Cesar Pelli 
 
YES YES 45 220m 2002 Tower Hamlets - 
‘The Gherkin’ 30 St Mary Axe 
 
Norman Foster YES YES 40 180m 2003 City of London - 
‘The Scalpel’ 52-54 Lime Street Kohn Pedersen Fox NO YES 39 192m 2018 
 
City of London - 
‘The Walkie-Talkie’ 20 Fenchurch Street 
 
Rafael Vinoli NO NO 36 160m 2014 City of London - 
Euston Tower 
 
286 Euston Road Sidney Kaye, Eric 
Firmin & Partners 
NO NO  36† 124m 1970 Camden - 
Britannic House 
 
1 Ropemaker Street F. Milton Cashmore 
& Niall D. Nelson 
NO YES  35‡ 122m 1967 City of London - 
Broadgate Tower 201 Bishopsgate Skidmore, Owings, 
and Merrill 
NO NO 33 164m 2009 City of London - 
- 25 Bank Street Cesar Pelli YES NO 33 153m 2003 Tower Hamlets 
 
- 
- 40 Bank Street Cesar Pelli YES NO 33 153m 2003 Tower Hamlets 
 
- 
Centre Point 103 New Oxford Street Richard Seifert 
 
NO NO  33† 121m 1965 Camden - 





21-24 Millbank Ronald Ward & 
Partners 
NO YES 32 118m 1961 Westminster - 
- 10 Upper Bank Street Kohn Pedersen Fox 
 
NO YES 31 151m 2003 Tower Hamlets - 
King’s Reach Tower 
 
Stamford Street Richard Seifert NO NO  29‡ 111m 1978 Southwark - 
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Empress State Building Empress Approach Stone, Toms & 
Partners 
NO NO  28‡ 
 
100m 1961 Hammersmith - 
Portland House 
 
Bressenden Place Howard Fairbairn & 
Partners 
NO NO 28 102m 1963 Westminster - 
The Willis Building 
 
51 Lime Street Norman Foster YES YES 28 125m 2007 City of London - 
Drapers Gardens 12 Throgmorton Street 
 
Richard Seifert NO YES 28 99m 1967 City of London 2007 
Commercial Union 
Tower 
1 Undershaft Gollins, Melvin, 
Ward 
NO YES 26 118m 1969 City of London - 
Shell Centre 
 
2 York Road Howard Robertson YES YES 26 107m 1962 Lambeth - 
Stock Exchange Tower 125 Old Broad Street F. Milton Cashmore 
& Partners 
NO YES  26‡ 99m 1969 City of London - 
Limebank House 
 
168 Fenchurch Street Richard Seifert NO YES 26 93m 1969 City of London 1998 
Kleinwort Benson 
Building 
20 Fenchurch Street 
 
William H. Rogers NO YES 25 91m 1968 City of London 2008 
New London Bridge 
House 
25 London Bridge Street Richard Seifert 
 
NO NO 25 94m 1967 Southwark 2010 
- 
 
99 Bishopsgate Richard Seifert NO NO 25 104m 1976 City of London - 
The London Studios 58-72 Upper Ground 
 
Elsom Pack & 
Roberts 
NO YES 25 82m 1973 Southwark - 
Southwark Towers 
 
32 London Bridge Street T.P. Bennett & Son NO NO 25 100m 1976 Southwark 2009 
- 
 
33 Canada Square Norman Foster YES YES 24 105m 1999 Tower Hamlets - 
‘The Can of Ham’ 60 St Mary Axe Foggo Associates NO NO 23 91m 2018 City of London - 
 
Ropemaker Place 25 Ropemaker Street Arup Associates 
 
NO NO 23 96m 2006 Islington - 
Marble Arch Tower 
 
55 Bryanston Street T.P. Bennett & Son NO NO 23 82m 1966 Westminster - 
Market Towers 
 
1 Nine Elms Lane GMW Architects NO YES 23 75m 1975 Lambeth - 
- 6-8 Bishopsgate 
 
GMW Architects NO YES 23 88m 1981 City of London - 
IQL S9 International 
Quarter 
12 Endeavour Square Richard Rogers YES NO 23 92m 2018 Newham - 
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Westminster City Hall 64 Victoria Street Burnet, Tait and 
Partners 
NO NO 22 76m 1966 Westminster - 
Angel Court 1 Angel Court Fitzroy Robinson 
and Partners 
NO NO 21 94m 1980 City of London - 
- 200 Aldersgate Street Fitzroy Robinson 
and Partners 
NO NO 21 91m 1992 City of London - 
One Cabot Square 1 Cabot Square Pei, Cobb, Freed & 
Partners 
YES NO 21 89m 1991 Tower Hamlets - 
Bastion House 140 London Wall Phillip Powell & 
Hidalgo Moya 
YES NO 21 69m 1976 City of London - 
Century House 
 
100 Westminster Bridge 
Road 
Devereux Architects NO NO 21 73m 1959 Lambeth - 
 
New Scotland Yard 10 Broadway Chapman, Taylor 
and Partners 
NO NO 21 67m 1962 Westminster 2017 
City Tower 40 Basinghall Street Burnet, Tait and 
Partners 
NO NO 21 69m 1957 City of London - 
†Building was allowed exceptional height as a concession for funding local roadworks. 
‡Additional floor(s) added since construction. Data represents originally constructed floor count. 
 
 






















London 7 55 28 20 1 6 14 25.45 
Chicago 111 301 123 160 16 2 9 2.99 
Houston 40 88 60 19 3 6 5 5.68 
Brussels 15 17 15 2 0 0 0 0.00 
Benidorm 384 26 0 25 1 0 0 0.00 
Sao Paulo 20 231 75 142 9 5 1 0.43 
Non-London - 663 273 348 29 13 15 2.26 
Total - 718 301 368 30 19 29 4.03 






Table A7: Chicago Buildings Designed by TA Architects Before and After their TA Award 
Building Name Address Architect TA Floors Height Year Built 
The Willis Tower 233 South Wacker Drive Nathaniel Owings  NO 110 442m 1974 
John Hancock Centre 875 North Michigan 
Avenue  
Nathaniel Owings NO 100 344m 1969 
Onterie Centre 441 East Erie Street  Nathaniel Owings YES 58 174m 1986 
Three First National Plaza 70 West Madison Street  Nathaniel Owings NO 57 234m 1981 
One Magnificent Mile 940-980 North Michigan 
Avenue  
Nathaniel Owings NO 57 205m 1983 
330 North Wabash 330 North Wabash Avenue  Ludwig Mies van der Rohe YES 52 212m 1973 
Madison Plaza 10 North Wells Street  Nathaniel Owings NO 44 182m 1982 
The Plaza on Dewitt 260 East Chestnut Street  Nathaniel Owings NO 43 120m 1966 
One Financial Place 440 South LaSalle Street  Nathaniel Owings NO 39 157m 1985 
Harris Bank Addition II 115 South LaSalle Street  Nathaniel Owings NO 38 155m 1974 
Gateway Centre III 222 South Riverside Plaza Nathaniel Owings  NO 35 137m 1971 
321 North Clark 321 North Clark Street  Nathaniel Owings  YES 35 155m 1987 
Cook County 
Administration Building 
69 West Washington Street  Louis Skimore YES 35 145m 1964 
Equitable Building 401 North Michigan 
Avenue  
Louis Skidmore YES 35 139m 1965 
Hartford Plaza South 150 South Wacker Drive  Nathaniel Owings NO 33 126m 1971 
Dirksen Federal Building, 
Chicago Federal Centre 
219,230 South Dearborn 
Street  
Ludwig Mies van der Rohe NO 30 117m 1964 
One Illinois Centre 111 East Wacker Drive  Ludwig Mies van der Rohe YES 30 110m 1970 
33 West Monroe 33 West Monroe Street  Nathaniel Owings NO 29 114m 1980 
University Hall 601 South Morgan Street Louis Skidmore YES 28 103m 1965 
Loop Transportation Centre 203 North LaSalle Street  Nathaniel Owings YES 27 102m 1985 
525 West Monroe 525 West Monroe Street  Nathaniel Owings NO 26 101m 1983 
33 North Dearborn 33 North Dearborn Street  Nathaniel Owings NO 25 106m 1966 
676 North St. Clair 676 North St. Clair Street Nathaniel Owings NO 25 101m 1979 
500 North Michigan 
Avenue 
500 North Michigan 
Avenue 
Nathaniel Owings NO 24 99m 1968 
River North Point 350 North Orleans Street Nathaniel Owings NO 24 85m 1977 
Gateway Centre IV 300 South Riverside Plaza Nathaniel Owings  NO 23 98m 1983 
Harris Bank Addition I 111 West Monroe Street Louis Skidmore YES 23 98m 1958 
CDW Plaza 120 South Riverside Plaza Nathaniel Owings  NO 21 87m 1967 
Gateway Centre I 10 South Riverside Plaza Louis Skidmore YES 21 87m 1965 
Hartford Plaza North 100 South Wacker Drive Louis Skidmore  YES 20 74m 1961 





For Online Publication only 
Appendix 4: Some Effects of TAs on Development Costs and Returns 
 
In Section 6 we showed the estimated value of a TA designed building in a non-HPA in the 
City of London using sample mean values observed from buildings in the City. These are 
shown in Table A8 below. 
 
Table A8 here: City of London means for relevant variables 
 
Kufner (2011) argues that planning applications for tall buildings in London require extra time 
to process and we provide some evidence in Tables A9 and A10. Although fragmentary this is 
consistent with this claim. There is also likely to be a substantial increase in the uncertainty of 
the outcome. An increase in uncertainty associated with attempting to build higher using a TA 
will be translated by the developer into higher risk. Developers will therefore demand a greater 
expected return (Mayo and Sheppard (2001). Furthermore, there may be additional planning 
costs when attempting to build exceptionally tall. For instance city planners generally require 
additional and more extensive impact assessments for tall buildings15, legal assistance may be 
protracted, the architect may be asked to successively redesign the proposal at various stages 
of the planning negotiation16, the planning authority may take additional time to deliberate17, 
and permission may still be ultimately refused at the local or national level (Kufner, 2011). 
Therefore, in order to assess the actual profit incentives for developers to hire TAs one should 
rescale expected returns by a discount rate commensurate with the additional planning risks 
and delays, and account for the additional costs of submitting a large scale development 
proposal to a local authority. 
 
                                                 
15 Additional assessments are: impact on TV/radio and air traffic assessment; more extensive environmental 
impact, sunlight and daylight assessment; wind-tunnel assessment, London views management framework 
assessment (LVMF) and Tower of London world heritage site assessment. These assessments require consultation 
with: London City airport, BAA safeguarding team, Royal Parks, Mayor of London, Surveyor to the Tower of 
London, Surveyor to the Fabric of St Paul’s Cathedral, International Council on Monuments and Sites (UNESCO), 
Design Council/CABE, adjoining LPAs on development which is likely to affect land in the LPA, LPAs with 
Strategic Views identified in LVMF. 
16 Powell (2006) for instance shows how at least 10 successive design proposals of Norman Foster’s ‘Gherkin’ at 
30 St Mary Axe were given to the City of London for review until their final approval. 
17 Kufner (2011) suggests that these additional regulatory demands increase the duration of the planning approval 




Table A9 here: Planning histories building size 
Table A10 here: Planning histories building approval 
 
From Table A9 we see that both ‘average’ and ‘tall’ buildings may have their initially proposed 
sizes either increased or decreased before final planning approval although the variation 
observed for ‘tall’ buildings greatly exceeds that for conventional ones. In Table A10, time 
elapsed to resolve the first planning application is perhaps the best metric for direct comparison 
of planning delay because once the first application has been accepted, future application 
approvals are generally processed more quickly18 . Taking a look at planning application 
timescales, Table A10 appears to show that first applications for ‘tall’ buildings require 
between 6-18 months of additional deliberation before a decision and two of the three were 
ultimately decided by the Cabinet minister responsible, whereas this was true of none of the 
normal-sized buildings. Taken together with the additional assessment requirements noted in 
the body of the paper, there appear to be substantial additional costs imposed by attempting to 
build tall. Unfortunately these various costs are so difficult to estimate with any certainty that 
our building cost consultants Gardiner & Theobald were unable to quote an expected value for 
them. 
 
In addition to the planning costs and uncertainties associated with building tall there is a further 
possible complicating factor: the speed with which TA buildings can be let. The TA rents 
estimated here assume that upon sale the building will have achieved the same occupancy rate 
as the sample average (91 percent). Of course in reality new developments are likely to be 
speculative, and it is far from certain that the building will be fully let on completion. Indeed, 
major projects with planning permission are routinely paused or abandoned in London due to 
a failure to secure a sufficient number of pre-lets. Any difference in the ability of average 
compared to tall buildings to secure first tenants and then become fully-let may further offset 
apparent economic rents and so reduce actual profits19. 
 
Table A11 here: Planning history lettings 
 
                                                 
18 Private communication with City of London Planning Authority to whom we are grateful for supplying this 
data. 





We look at this – at least for this small sample of buildings – in Table A11. We see that, 
unsurprisingly, the bespoke (built for specific occupiers) Riverbank House and ‘Gherkin’ 
achieved the fastest first and complete lettings of, respectively, the ‘average’ and ‘tall’ 
buildings. However it took the ‘tall’ ‘Gherkin’ 62 more months to achieve this than the 
‘average’ Riverbank House. Looking at the non-bespoke buildings the two other ‘average’ 
buildings achieved first lettings between 4-43 months and full lettings 55-89 months before the 
other two ‘tall’ buildings. This small case study suggests that in general tall/large buildings do 
indeed struggle to secure full tenancy compared to their smaller counterparts. 
 
Yet another possible way in which the employment of a TA might influence developers’ 
expected revenues would be if TA buildings systematically conceded different rent-free periods 
in order to attract tenants. Note that since building sales can (and generally are) timed by 
developers to coincide with full occupation, rent-free concessions for space in TA-designed 
buildings would not necessarily show up in the sale price analysis of Error! Reference source 
not found.20; nevertheless such differentials would be relevant to any aspiring developer. We 
test this hypothesis with a sample of 17 leases from TA and 59 leases from standard buildings 
comprising 47 buildings altogether, and examine whether TA buildings yielded different rent-
free periods in a series of hierarchical regressions. All leases in the sample contained a positive 
rent-free period incentive. Robust standard errors are used as White tests reject 
homoskedasticity. The results reported in Table A12 provide no evidence that rent-free periods 
vary significantly between type of architect or the amount of space leased. 
 
Table A12 here: Rent-free period regressions 
 
In sum, it appears that at least a substantial proportion of the additional, very conservatively 
estimated ‘rent’ needs to be set against identifiable additional costs and the additional time (6-
18 months) and expense, incurred in obtaining planning approval for tall buildings, and the 
longer period required to fully let such a building (up to 140 months). Assuming the TA 
building could; (i) be let for rents of £861/m2 per year21 discounted at 10%, (ii) receive time-
proportionate lettings and a 24 month additional wait to fully let the building from construction 
                                                 
20 Note that it is superfluous to test for increased rents in TA buildings, since any rental-price anomalies would 
directly translate into higher sale prices, which were not observed in Table 6. 
21 Source: Gardiner & Theobald. This assumption yields annual rents for our hypothetical 8-floor SA and 22-




start (taking a total of 48 months), and therefore sell it, and (iii) interest rates of 10 percent; the 
net cost to the developer of this slower take-up would be the difference in the gain in total 
rental payments over the longer letting period of £32m, and the cost in additional interest 
payments on the construction loan of £41m. Net, therefore, this letting delay costs the developer 
£9m. These results are summarized in Table A13 below.  
 
Table A13 here: Quantifiable costs of delay 
 
We then must also add the unquantifiable costs associated with the required higher rate of 
expected return to the developer to compensate for the risky business of going down the TA 
route and trying to build tall rather than taking the much less risky route provided by a building 
of standard permitted heights. Assuming that developers cannot earn supernormal returns 
would suggest that these ‘unquantifiable’ costs are equivalent to as much as £149m − £9m, or 
£140m. 
 
The estimates of surpluses, economic rents, and deadweight losses in Section 6 were calculated 
by comparing the estimated costs and sale prices of SA and TA buildings. Surplus-maximizing 




Table A8: City of London means for relevant variables 
Variable Values assumed 
Modern TA  e† 
Within HPA  1‡ 
Listed 1 
Office Permission Refusal Rate  0.44% 
Employment Density 600m 93,388 
Listed Building Density 2,144 
Above Ground Floors 8/22 
Office Space Grade A e 
Percent Occupied  91% 
 
†ln(e)=1, i.e. the dummy variable is indicated in log form. 
‡ln(1)=0, i.e. the dummy variable is not indicated in log form. 
 
Table A9: Planning histories building size 













Clements House 20 Gresham Street NO   8   8   32,396  32,022    -1 
Riverbank House 2 Swan Lane NO 11 11   39,567  42,291   +7 
Premier Place 2-5 Devonshire Square NO   9   9   27,000  23,226  -14 
Heron Tower 110 Bishopsgate NO 34 46   32,516  42,873 +24 




‘Walkie-Talkie’ 20 Fenchurch Street NO 42 36   91,000  84,913    -7 
 
Table A10: Planning histories building approval 




















Clements House 20 Gresham Street 3 3  10.0 10 12/1997 NO 
Riverbank House 2 Swan Lane 2 2    7.5 10 06/2002 NO 
Premier Place 2-5 Devonshire Square 5 5     2.6†   4 02/1997 NO 
Heron Tower 110 Bishopsgate 2 2 14.5  22 07/1999 YES 
‘Gherkin’ 30 St Mary Axe 2 1 14.5     16+‡ 02/1996 NO 
‘Walkie-Talkie’ 20 Fenchurch Street 2 2 13.5 16 05/2005 YES 
†Simultaneous applications were submitted and decided concurrently. 
‡Application withdrawn after 16 months of deliberation. 
 
 
Table A11: Planning history lettings 


















Clements House 20 Gresham Street NO 06/2006 05/2008   23 06/2010  48 
Riverbank House 2 Swan Lane YES 09/2009 10/2006 -35 10/2006 -35 
Premier Place 2-5 Devonshire Square NO 07/1999 11/2000  16 11/2000  16 
Heron Tower 110 Bishopsgate NO 07/2007 10/2010  39 01/2016         103* 
‘Gherkin’ 30 St Mary Axe YES 07/1995    11/1997  27 11/1997      27** 
‘Walkie-Talkie’ 20 Fenchurch Street NO 07/2007 06/2012  59 03/2016      105*** 
†Construction is considered to have started once demolition of the previous building commenced. 
* Completed 03/2011; only 45 percent let as of 02/2013; 63 percent let as of 09/2013; 100 percent let as of 01/2016. 
**100 percent effectively let through purchase of scheme by Swiss RE on 06/1998 conditional on planning permission which was then granted 
on 08/2000. 
***Completed 04/2014: construction paused between 04/2009-02/2011; 57 percent pre-let as of 09/2013, 87 percent let as of 05/2014, 98 










Table A12: Rent-free period regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 








     
TA Building 5.203 1.115 -0.442 -0.913 
 (3.440) (3.052) (3.033) (3.013) 
Lease Length (years)  1.467*** 1.102*** 1.178*** 
  (0.269) (0.249) (0.234) 
Lease Floorspace m2   0.000354 0.000368 
   (0.000274) (0.000276) 




    (0.372) 
Contract Start 2003 3.734 10.93* 13.24 12.72 
 (4.174) (6.328) (8.593) (8.700) 
Contract Start 2004 -2.889 4.119 8.349 8.276 
 (4.446) (6.460) (8.900) (8.895) 
Contract Start 2005 10.70** 16.13** 19.03** 18.68** 
 (4.188) (6.586) (8.846) (8.878) 
Contract Start 2006 -2.438 3.140 5.909 5.947 
 (3.975) (6.123) (8.643) (8.648) 
Contract Start 2007 -9.401 -0.215 0.780 0.210 
 (5.807) (7.151) (8.963) (9.034) 
Contract Start 2008 -8.924 5.365 8.307 7.738 
 (5.958) (7.691) (9.713) (9.909) 
Contract Start 2009 15.33 25.31** 24.70** 24.43** 
 (11.05) (10.74) (10.98) (10.98) 
Contract Start 2010 2.714 13.84 15.22 13.61 
 (5.591) (7.167) (9.275) (9.479) 
Contract Start 2011 -6.540 9.913 11.45 9.985 
 (4.245) (6.892) (9.070) (9.512) 
Contract Start 2012 -1.448 11.01 13.21 11.57 
 (4.125) (6.815) (8.905) (9.224) 
Contract Start 2013 1.234 15.76** 17.47** 15.03 
 (5.499) (6.504) (8.625) (9.288) 
Constant 17.27*** -9.729 -8.693 -9.913 
 (3.463) (7.561) (9.113) (9.054) 
Observations 76 76 76 76 
R-squared 0.287 0.567 0.598 0.603 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Building Depreciation = the number of years between the building construction date/most recent refurb and the 
lease start. 
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 Total rents received until sale Extra financing cost Net quantifiable costs of delay 
8-floor SA £8m after 24months £33m×10%×2 years= £7m - 
22-floor TA £40m after 48months £119m×10%×4 years = £48m - 
Difference +£32m -£41m -£9m 
